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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates why Iraq’s Sunnis resorted to violent collective action, 
rather than non-violent political action, following Saddam’s overthrow.  Using social 
movement theory, I argue that decreasing political opportunity, existing mobilizing 
structures with violent repertoires, and effective framing of the opposition as kufr (non-
Muslim) explain the emergence of Iraq’s Sunni insurgency.  I posit that Sunnis felt a 
profound grievance in the decreased political opportunity following the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein.  Furthermore, mobilization nearly always utilizes existing networks and 
adapts the characteristics of the physical spaces and organizational structures from which 
the movement emerges.  I argue that the disbanded military and militant Islamist 
networks comprised the bulk of the first insurgent groups, and that these groups used 
their existing repertoires to shape Iraq’s political environment.  I then trace the frames 
used throughout the conflict, illustrating that the common theme is opposition to rule by 
kufr – whether it be Coalition nations or Iraqi Shi’a – and this provides a concrete target 
for the insurgency.  Examined collectively, these three factors provide a sufficient 
explanation for the Sunni insurgents’ turn to violence to address their political 
grievances.  This argument stands in contrast to the clash of civilizations and “Cosmic 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq with the stated goal of removing 
Saddam Hussein’s regime from power.  The combat concluded quickly and almost 
surgically.  After major combat operations ended, however, scattered anti-Coalition 
attacks grew into a full-scale insurgency.  Understanding the basic identity and 
addressing the grievances of the insurgents have proven difficult, however.  Attempts to 
appease one group invariably enrage others, continuing the cycle of attacks on Coalition 
forces.  I investigate why Iraq’s Sunnis resorted to violent collective action rather than 
non-violent political activities following Saddam’s overthrow.  I narrow the scope by 
studying only the Sunni identity group and utilize social movement theory (SMT) as the 
analytical framework.   
Why did a large portion of Iraq’s Sunni population turn to collective violence for 
political action?  Is this violence explained by a clash of civilizations or religious 
aversion to representative governance?  Do non-religious variables such as diminished 
political opportunity, particular forms of framing, mobilizing structures and collective 
action repertoires provide a more sufficient explanation than conventional explanations 
like religion and culture? 
I argue that instead of perennial cultural factors, it was decreasing political 
opportunity1, the existing mobilizing structures2 containing violent collective 
repertoires,3 and effective framing of the opposition as non-Muslims (anti-kufr framing)4 
 
1 I define political opportunity as the structures and conditions, both formal and informal, available to 
a particular group at a specific point in time. 
2 I define mobilizing structures as the organizations and structures by which a group acquires 
collective control over the resources needed for action, including manpower, skills and repertoires.  These 
structures are then used to carry out the collective action, and necessarily influence the direction and tone 
of the activities and outcomes. For more information, see Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). 
3 I define repertoires as the set of skills and resources available to a group.  For example, non-violent 
conflict resolution in the political process is in the repertoire of American politicians, whereas the state’s 
conflict resolution process in Iraq often relied solely on the use of force. 
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that caused the initial Sunni resort to violence.  Doug McAdam, et al., made a compelling 
argument for this framework, which I adapt to explain the Sunni insurgency in Iraq.  I 
conclude that Sunnis felt a profound grievance in the decreased political opportunity 
following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.  Existing institutions exacerbated this 
grievance, since mobilization nearly always makes use of existing networks and adapts 
the characteristics of the physical spaces and organizational structures from which the 
movement emerges.  I argue that the disbanded military and militant Islamist networks 
that comprised the bulk of the first insurgent groups used their existing repertoires to 
shape Iraq’s political environment.  Frames or the spin of movement slogans added 
impetus to these factors.  I then trace the development of frames throughout the conflict 
between the Coalition and Iraq’s Sunni insurgents, illustrating that the most common 
theme is opposition to rule by kufr or non-believer (whether Coalition or Iraqi Shi’a).  
This framing provided a concrete target for the insurgency.  Collectively, these three 
factors provide a sufficient explanation for the Sunni insurgents’ turn to violence to 
address their political grievances, while highlighting the historical and contingent nature 
of that violence. 
 
4 David Snow and Robert Benford define a frame as “an interpretive schema that simplifies and 
condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, 
experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.”  Quoted in Jeff Goodwin, 
James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, “Introduction: Why Emotions Matter,” in Rethinking Social 
Movements: Structure, Meaning and Emotion, ed. Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (Boulder: Rowan & 
Littlefield, 2004), 6. 
 A kufr is a non-Muslim, and many Muslims view rule by a kufr over Muslims as un-Islamic.  
Therefore, many of the frames used by the anti-Coalition forces rely heavily on symbols and images 
designed to equate any support for Coalition actions with supporting rule by kufr.  These messages fall into 
the “anti-kufr frame” and have been effective in motivating opposition to the Coalition. 
3 
Figure 1.   Social Movement Theory and the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq 
 
The alternative explanation argues that Sunni violence is caused by religious 
motivations.  This opposing thesis is characterized by terrorism expert Mark 
Juergensmeyer’s explanation of “Cosmic War.”  In this perspective, proponents view 
worldly events in terms of right and wrong, good and evil.5  Accepting or cooperating 
with occupation by non-Muslims is seen as irreligious, and fighting the occupiers 
becomes a religious duty.  Bernard Lewis’s clash of civilizations6 falls into this category, 
as well as the tendency of many Sunnis to dismiss Shi’a political power as rule by non-
Muslims.  I contend that this is an insufficient explanation.  Sunni collective identity is 
based upon secular concepts as well as the religious differentiation from the Shi’a.  
Previous positive relationships – and even intermarriage – illustrate that religious 
divisions cannot cause the current Sunni violence in Iraq, but can certainly exacerbate it.  
Indeed, none of the works in this category offer a detailed explanation of why secular 
Sunnis mobilized to violence so quickly. 
Studying the Sunni insurgency through the SMT lens provides useful insights into 
why the insurgents take certain actions, what actions are likely to follow, and even which 
intervention points possibly provide the best return on investment for the United States.  
                                                 
5 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2003), 149. 
6 Bernard Lewis, “Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly (September 1990), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm (accessed 7 August 2006).  Although Samuel Huntington 
made this phrase famous with his 1993 article and 1998 book, Bernard Lewis coined the term in 1990. 
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From an operational and policy perspective, this study helps to identify the roles played 
by identity groups and social forces in Iraq.  Such an understanding may aid the United 
States in appealing to and integrating moderates, while marginalizing the hardliners 
whose goals are mutually exclusive with Coalition aims.  I distinguish and characterize 
the insurgents along these lines.  From an academic perspective, my analysis contributes 
to the body of war and social movement literature by providing further insight into 
military intervention in identity group conflicts.  I also address the role of extremist 
ideologies in social mobilization and political development.  
 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Ian Becket explains that “[i]nsurgency is...a highly political act arising from some 
sense of grievance, or upon the exploitation and manipulation of grievance.”7  Social 
movement theory accepts that such structural explanations are a key foundation for 
explaining sustained collective action, but a grievance cannot create such action by itself.  
Therefore, any theory providing causal links for collective action must account for which 
political grievances are translated into action.  In his summary of SMT literature, Doug 
McAdam explains the three ingredients that establish this causal link: Political 
Opportunity, Mobilizing Structures and Framing.8  In general terms, political opportunity 
explains the grievance and creates the opportunity to mobilize but does not predict the 
outcome, which could span from widespread collective mobilization to a missed 
opportunity yielding no collective action.  Mobilizing structures are the organizations and 
resources that provide the means to act.  Framing describes a group’s attempt to diagnose 
the problem, place the blame on a responsible party, and motivate a support base to 
address the grievance.  Taken together, these three ideas establish a causal link between a 
political grievance and collective action. 
 
7 Ian F.W. Becket, Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, US Army War College, January 2005), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=592 (accessed June 11, 2006), 2. 
8 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and 
Framing Processes – Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements,” in Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing, 
ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 3. 
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Turning to political opportunity, Doug McAdam, et al., explain that political 
opportunity analyzed through the work of Charles Tilly (1978), Doug McAdam (1982), 
and Sidney Tarrow (1983) firmly establishes the link between institutionalized politics 
and social movements.9  At that time, Americans were attempting to explain the 
emergence of social movements based on changes in a system’s structure, but Europeans 
were trying to account for the success or failure of a movement through differences in 
political characteristics of a nation state.  Combining these frameworks, this thesis 
addresses both why the Iraqi insurgency arose and what political conditions allowed it to 
organize and operate.10  The removal of Saddam’s regime provided a range of political 
grievances, and the lack of control over the physical and political spaces in Iraq allowed 
the insurgents to mobilize. 
The two most common criteria for categorization of political grievances and goals 
for protest in Iraq are secular versus Islamist and indigenous versus transnational, 
although none of the literature reviewed specifically used these categories to provide a 
complete picture of the Sunni insurgent groups.  Using these criteria, the groups can be 
described as indigenous secularists, transnational secularists, indigenous Islamists and 
transnational Islamists.  Every major Sunni insurgent group in Iraq fits into one of these 
categories. 
Indigenous secularists include any homegrown Iraqi groups that have non-
religious motivations and goals, such as former regime loyalists (FRLs), Iraqi 
nationalists, and Ba’athist restorationists.  Ideologues generally have straightforward 
grievances and goals: anger and frustration over lost status and income, fear of Shi’a 
supremacy in the new government, and a desire to protect Sunni interests or return to a 
Sunni-dominated power structure in Iraq.  Transnational secularists include two subsets: 
criminals and agents of foreign nations.  Members of this group are generally not 
involved in insurgent operations, but support the insurgents by providing supplies and 
funds.  Although the majority of insurgents and most of the support for the insurgency 
appear to be secular in orientation, Islamist extremists seem to capture most of the 
 
9 McAdam, et al., 3. 
10 I define political opportunity as the structures and conditions, both formal and informal, available to 
a particular group at a specific point in time. 
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mainstream media’s attention.  In Iraq, Islamist militants can be divided into those 
indigenous to Iraq and transnational Islamists.  The most radical of the Islamists decry 
apostate regimes and see democracy as an affront to God’s sovereignty, while moderate 
Islamists may be drawn into a representative government if assured that this government 
will operate in accordance with the Qur’an.  Organizing Iraq’s insurgents into these four 
groups will allow an effective counterstrategy to be more easily created; each group is 
treated with more precision in later chapters. 
To summarize political opportunities in Iraq, the literature varies from macro-
level explanations of the causes of instability to very detailed descriptions of how 
structural concerns affect insurgent perceptions of political opportunity in Iraq’s Sunni 
insurgency.  Generally, this literature can be divided into two groups: Structural, which 
focuses on the relationship between violence and political and economic grievances, such 
as inequality, unemployment, poverty, or lack of democracy;11 and cultural, which 
focuses on the difference between the values and beliefs of terrorists and their targets.12  
Social movement theory provides a model that blends these two approaches, asserting 
that political opportunity is only one aspect that aids in establishing the causal and 
procedural links between political grievances and violent collective action. 
Drawing on Tilly, I define mobilizing structures as the organizations and 
structures by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for 
action, including manpower, skills and repertoires.13  These structures are then used to 
carry out the collective action, and necessarily influence the direction and tone of the 
activities and outcomes.  The literature illuminates similarities and differences in how 
various authors analyze the insurgency and categorize its groups, including level of 
aggregation, criteria for grouping, and possibility of rapprochement. 
First, every author reviewed cautioned readers about the accuracy of such 
categories, given the disparate nature of the groups’ memberships, origins and goals.  
This highlights an important discrepancy in the body of literature that directly affects 
each analyst’s categories: What is the appropriate level of aggregation for the groupings?   
11 Proponents include Charles Tilly, Ian Lustic, Erica Chenoweth, and Michael Mousseau. 
12 Proponents include Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington. 
13 Charles Tilly.  From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 7. 
7 
Cordesman reflects a popular opinion that not enough information is available for more 
than a cursory grouping into two broad categories for the entire insurgency.  Presumably 
for him the Sunni and Shi’a division is self-evident.  Baram adds subdivisions within his 
two major groupings, plus a third category for more precision.  Mark Steliga attempts to 
provide the most precision by dividing the Sunni insurgents into four groups. 
Secondly, little agreement exists over what criteria should differentiate the 
categories.  Cordesman’s simple categories distinguish between secular and Islamist, as 
most of the writing on this topic does, while Baram adds an additional level of detail by 
separating the tribes from either section and breaks out moderates and radicals from 
ultraradicals.  Steliga’s categories for Sunni insurgents are based on origin and goals 
(tribal affiliation or former regime), and ideology (Islamists and nationalists). 
Finally, most categories implicitly address the issue of rapprochement.  Baram 
formally includes it as a separate method of categorization, but even Cordesman 
addresses the issue.  Most authors generally agree that transnational Islamists have no 
interest in cooperating with the government, but many secular insurgent groups can be 
readily co-opted if the governing structure protects their perceived interests.  
Interestingly, this division seems to have the most policy saliency but receives the least 
emphasis in the literature. 
Political grievances and mobilizing structures are necessary conditions for 
sustained social movements, but these do not explain why individuals mobilize to 
collective action.  The concept of frames and framing offers one explanation.  Frames 
diagnose the problem, place the blame on a target group, and motivate individuals to 
action.  In this section, I review the literature on framing in the insurgency. 
The literature exploring framing in the current Iraqi conflict is rather sparse, and 
not much agreement exists on how the frames should be categorized.  Three authors 
provide a representative sample of the current state of literature on this topic.  First, 
Amatzia Baram divides the insurgents into groups based upon goals or motivations, such 
as secularists/ideologues, which include former Ba'athists, Saddam loyalists, and Arab 
8 
                                                
nationalists; tribes; and Islamists from moderate to ultra-radical.14  While he does not 
directly categorize frames, Baram discusses what appear to be framesets based upon the 
insurgents’ ideological motivations.  This categorization provides a useful congruence 
between the organization of insurgent groups and many of the messages proliferating 
from movements in Iraq. 
In one of the few works dealing directly with framing in the Iraqi insurgency, 
Timothy Haugh defines categories based upon the subject attacked in the message.  He 
claims that the overarching frame is anti-Coalition, calling for expelling the Coalition for 
many reasons, including patriotism, pan-Arabism or Islamism.  The anti-Iraqi 
government frame follows close behind, and generally includes statements to 
decredential the Iraqi government and encourage individuals to actively oppose the new 
form of government.  The less common anti-collaboration frame discourages any 
cooperation with the government, and often claims that the penalty for collaborators is 
death.15   
Lastly, Anthony Cordesman divides the Sunni insurgents into two simple groups: 
the native Iraqi Sunni insurgents, who are mainly nationalists or tribal fighters concerned 
mostly with influencing the power structure that will govern them, and the “neo-Salafi” 
Islamists who are engaged in a regional or global war to implement a puritan Sunni 
state.16  Cordesman appears to believe that since nearly all of the statements in question 
are anti-Coalition, the messages coming from Iraq should be generally categorized based 
upon motivations.  Religiously motivated messages fall into one group and most other 
messages are in a secular category combining issues such as tribalism, pan-Arabism and 
Iraqi nationalism.  The themes of these messages are very similar and further 
disaggregation is unnecessary. 
 
14 Amatzia Baram, Who Are the Insurgents: Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq, (US Institute of Peace, April 
2005), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr134.html (accessed 11 June 2006). 
15 Timothy Haugh, Maj, USAF, “Analysis of Sunni-Based Opposition in Iraq,” Strategic Insights 4, 
issue 5 (May 2005), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/May/haughSunniMay05.asp (accessed 11 June 
2006). 
16 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Zarqawi’s Death: Temporary “Victory” or Lasting Impact” (Working 
draft, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 June 2006), 5. 
9 
These three methods of grouping based on goals, subject or origin reflect the 
general agreement in the literature that the main theme of messages released by Sunni 
insurgent groups is anti-Coalition.  Beyond this, however, the literature differs on 
categorizing by content, ideology or the message’s source.  Additionally, while the 
authors may admit that frames must resonate with the target’s identity to be effective, the 
categories do not address any collective identity beyond current goals or membership in a 
particular political organization.   
After studying the history of the Sunni identity and reconciling this with the 
messages released by Iraq’s Sunni insurgent groups, I submit three new framing 
categories that provide both organization and historical perspective to the current debate: 
foreign occupation, army as arbiter of politics, and worldly power as a symbol of God’s 
favor.  These frames reflect the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames outlined 
by Snow and Benford, with which insurgents diagnose the problem as occupation, 
propose a solution that justifies violence, and motivates individuals to participate.  The 
frames resonate with the population only because they tap into the collective Sunni 
identity. 
In conclusion, literature on social movement theory and writings on the 
insurgency in Iraq could fill volumes, but few authors attempt to definitively reconcile 
theory with the current conflict.  Taken individually, political opportunity writings are 
present in nearly every discipline of political science, but not all effectively link 
grievances to collective action.  The writings relating this topic to Iraq are generic and 
unexciting; this likely reflects the general consensus that Sunni grievances are structural, 
citing the power lost with Saddam’s fall, or cultural, such as the clash of civilizations 
arguments.  Still fewer works attempt to trace the connection between Sunni grievances 
and collective action with more precision than the recognition that they had grievances to 
be addressed.  None offer an in-depth discussion on why secular Sunnis chose violence to 
express their political opposition. 
The works that connect grievances to action generally use some form of SMT  
to do so, and framing plays an important role in this process.  These writings were  
10 
long on theory but short on data and application to Iraq.  More research is  
required to bridge the gap between theory and reality. 
Most of the SMT-relevant literature about Iraq’s insurgency involves various 
forms of mobilizing structures, generally in an attempt to describe and explain the 
insurgent organizations in order to defeat them.  Many give a passing nod to addressing 
the causes but generally discuss casualty figures, tactics and techniques, or 
membership/identity aspects.  Little research attempts to draw causal links between 
grievances, structures and ending the conflict. 
Overall, the large body of literature on the Iraqi insurgency lacks a synthesis to 
reconcile “facts on the ground” with theoretical constructs such as social movement 
theory.  This is difficult because the insurgency progresses quickly and accurate data is 
hard to obtain, but the time has come to put this situation in a larger context and go 
beyond how loss of status angers Sunnis.  My thesis addresses this gap by arguing that 
decreasing political opportunity, effective anti-kufr framing, and existing mobilizing 
structures caused the Sunnis to resort to violence so quickly.  Recognizing these lessons 
may highlight new intervention points that can bring an end to the violence in Iraq.  The 
future of Iraq depends not only upon addressing political grievances of the population, 
but also upon the insurgents’ ability to frame the issues in such a way that the population 
is motivated to participate in high-risk, violent collective action. 
 
B. ROADMAP FOR THIS THESIS 
Chapter II explores the construction of the Sunni Arab identity and its role 
throughout Iraq’s history, and posits that this identity is a critical issue in understanding 
the Iraqi conflict.  I demonstrate that despite Sunni claims that the Sunni-Shi’a split is 
based upon religious foundations, the identity actually rests as much on the concepts of 
geography, governing practices and shared historical memory as any religious 
differences. 
Chapter III explains the importance of political opportunity, and how loyalty to 
identity groups increases, becoming “us versus them” when political opportunity is 
threatened.  I argue that Iraq’s Sunni Arabs suffered a tremendous loss of political power 
11 
relative to Iraq’s Shi’a following Saddam’s overthrow.  Since this loss was keenly felt by 
the Sunnis, the struggle took the tone of Sunni versus Shi’a and accentuated the religious 
aspect of the division. 
Much of the SMT literature claims that social movements tap into existing 
networks for mobilization, rather than attempting to build their own networks from 
ground zero.  In Chapter IV, I apply this theory to Iraq by examining the networks that 
the Sunni insurgents utilized for their operations.  I pay special attention to the disbanded 
military, which not only provided manpower, organization and hierarchy, but also the 
arms and equipment to resist the Coalition and Shi’a.  I also include militant Islamism 
with a short discussion on foreign influence.  I argue that the Sunnis’ adoption of these 
two networks for their mobilization largely accounts for the Sunni decision to turn to 
violence, and also speaks to the speed with which the violence appeared.  Furthermore, 
because of Iraq’s history, many Iraqis do not have the skills needed for non-violent 
conflict resolution; the fact that they only had violent repertoires available to them, 
coupled with the structures used for mobilization, greatly impacted the mobilization 
towards violence. 
Chapter V analyses the role of frames and Sunni framing contests.  I begin by 
examining some historical frames used by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and explore why these 
frames resonate with the collective Sunni identity.  Then, I apply these lessons to frames 
currently in use by Sunni insurgents.  I argue that the overarching theme of Sunni framing 
attempts is anti-kufr.  For both anti-Coalition and anti-Shi’a frames, this takes the form of 
aversion to rule by non-Muslims.  In addition, this anti-kufr frame often spills over into 
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II. SUNNI COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN IRAQ 
What role does identity play in violent social movements, and what creates this 
identity?  What impact does it have upon an individual’s calculus to engage in high-risk 
collective action like the current Sunni insurgency?  First and foremost, individuals base 
their decisions on a perception of “who they are” and this affects the US’s ability to 
resolve the conflict.  In Iraq today, for example, the composition and procedures of the 
new government are being drafted based on fair representation for Sunnis, Shi’a and 
Kurds, and the threat of full-scale civil war between two of these identity groups looms 
on the horizon.  Clearly, understanding the historical foundations for these identities will 
aid in addressing grievances to promote stability for Iraq.  In this chapter, I show that the 
Sunni identity is based on many secular factors in addition to the religious distinctions, 
regardless of claims by Islamist insurgents and many authors describing the conflict as 
fundamentally religious in nature. 
 
A. THE THEORY OF IDENTITY 
What is identity?  Unfortunately, identity is an important but amorphous concept 
that remains largely undefined.  Describing the characteristics of identity seems much 
easier than creating an all-encompassing definition.  Ascriptive terms like birthplace, sex 
and religion inform identity calculations, but Jillian Schwedler posits that practice can 
have a more forceful impact than inherited traits, especially regarding religion.17  For this 
thesis, I use Schwedler’s approach to identity as a construction based on processes: 
Identity is indeed how individuals and groups define themselves and their 
relations to others.  But it is not a fixed set of characteristics; it is instead 
the product of historical processes and experiences through which 
individuals and groups come to see themselves, their place in the world, 
and their relationships with those around them.18
This approach necessarily requires that identity be constructed through experiences, but 
what types of experiences create or alter identity?  Construction takes place through 
 
17 Jillian Schwedler, “Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace or Mobilizer,” SAIS Review, A Journal of 
International Affairs 21, no. 2, Summer-Fall (2001): 3. 
18 Ibid., 5. 
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significant events, especially crises, and through public debate as state and non-state 
actors vie for influence over the identity.  This struggle often takes place in the popular 
media and sometimes in the form of ideological debates over which ideas the individual 
should internalize.  Schwedler also explains that identity is partially “based on one’s 
location within complex sets of social relations, with different identities varying in 
prominence from one situation to another.”19  For example, an Arab may emphasize his 
role as head of household at one moment, then as a son or husband shortly thereafter, 
while maintaining his identity of good Muslim to guide his actions in both situations. 
In addition to personal identity, individuals often partake in various collective 
identities that are also internalized to guide their thoughts and actions.  William Gamson 
explains that collective identities are generally based in culture and are observable 
manifestations of thought and behavior: 
We know a collective identity through the cultural icons and artifacts 
displayed by those who embrace it.  It is manifested in styles of dress, 
language, and demeanor.  Collective identity need not be treated as some 
mysterious intangible but can be as empirically observable as a T-shirt or 
haircut.  To measure it, one would ask people about the meaning of labels 
and other cultural symbols, not about their own personal identity.20
Collective identities fundamentally alter an individual’s decision process by providing a 
lens through which to view the world and by providing scales of value in addition to the 
variables identified in realist calculations of cost and benefit.  Moreover, loyalty to a 
collective identity can encourage behaviors even if the cost-benefit analysis does not 
favor the individual adopting that behavior, such as a soldier dying for his country.21  
This argument does not deny that social activists engage in rational cost-benefit analysis, 
but that “any strategic paradigm necessarily presupposes a theory of identity.  
Assumptions about social identity are implicit.”22  In other words, people act rationally 
only in the context of their personal relationships and values. 
 
19 Schwedler, 4. 
20 William Gamson, “The Social Psychology of Collective Action” in Frontiers in Social Movement 
Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 60. 
21 Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, “Introduction: Why Emotions Matter,” in 
Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning and Emotion, ed. Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper 
(Boulder: Rowan & Littlefield, 2004), 9. 
22 Gamson, 59. 
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Raphael Patai begins his explanation of Arab identity with a simple explanation of 
concentric circles, noting that loyalty ties are strongest in the first circle and lessen as 
identity radiates outwards.  His model includes three circles beginning with Islam as the 
outermost, Middle East as the middle, and Arabs as the closest and most salient identity 
factor.23  Noted regional scholar Bernard Lewis utilizes the same model but disagrees on 
the content: 
The first is blood, that is to say, in ascending order, the family, the clan, 
the tribe, developing into an ethnic nation.  The second is by place....This 
may mean the village or neighborhood, district or quarter, province or 
city....The third...is the religious community....For many, religion is the 
only loyalty that transcends local and immediate bonds.24
Critics of Patai and Lewis question the notion of pan-Arabism and have noted that Arabs 
often use the identity concept of “Arab” and “Islam” interchangeably.  These critics reject 
claims of monolithic identities and attempt to break identity into smaller units to study. 
 
B. SUNNI COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
Narrowing down the Arab identity, then, how is the Iraqi Sunni identity 
constructed?  Understanding that even this unit can be broken into smaller components, it 
still retains identifiable traits that would qualify it as a recognizable identity group.  
Given this position, what key historical developments led to the Sunni identity prevalent 
in Iraq today?  Several factors combine to construct a Sunni identity that has coalesced 
into a firm, though not unyielding social fact that affects nearly every aspect of a Sunni’s 
life in Iraq.  In this section, I discuss how religious divisions, geography, the governing 
policies of colonial and indigenous regimes, and a shared historical memory impact the 
Sunni narrative. 
It remains important to note, however, that Iraq is not necessarily a society 
divided.  As Faleh Jabar explains,  
Neither Shi’is nor Sunnis form a monolithic bloc imbued with a sectarian 
sense of unity of action and perception. Sunnis and Shi’is are divided into 
modern classes (business class, middle class, peasants, landlords, and 
 
23 Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), 9-10. 
24 Bernard Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East (New York: Schocken Books, 1988), 6. 
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others) and traditional status groups (nobles, clerics, tribal chieftains, and 
others), with sundry ideological and hierarchical (familial or tribal) 
fracture lines dividing these imagined sectarian ‘communities.’25   
While boundaries do exist in Iraqi society, individuals frequently cross them in order to 
do business with, socially interact with, and even marry individuals from other groups.  
Contrary to the prevailing atmosphere in popular Western media, Sunni-Shi’a 
intermarriage is common even in Baghdad, in the heart of the Sunni Triangle. 
 
1. Religion 
At the most basic level, the distinction between Sunni and Shi’a is a religious one 
beginning with the death of the Prophet.  The Shi’a believe that Muhammad designated 
his son-in-law Ali to succeed him as leader of Islam and that the caliphate should pass 
down Muhammad’s hereditary lineage, while the Sunnis do not believe that Muhammad 
appointed a successor but created processes for appointing or electing the caliph.  This 
disagreement immediately became a power struggle for legitimate leadership in the 
religion, and eventually spawned differences over practice, theology and identity.  
Notwithstanding theological factors, one major aspect of this split is the structure of 
authority and reliance on clergy.  While the Shi’a rely heavily on a hierarchical structure 
for religious concerns, Sunnis believe that an individual’s relationship with God is direct 
and requires no intermediaries.  For this reason, the Sunni religious organization tends to 
be decentralized and autonomous, and Sunnis can choose desirable aspects from various 
ulama rather than depending on a single marja to emulate. 
Beyond the basic identity of being a Muslim, fundamentalist groups have 
occasionally influenced the debate over identity in Iraq.  Even though Saddam was a 
secular ruler, for example, he allowed Islam to regain some influence over Iraqis’ 
identities during the last decade of his rule.  At this point, many young Iraqi men thought 
that the Ba’ath Party had lost its ideological coherence and eschewed the Party’s original 
ideas in search of an alternate belief system.  Since the sanctions had partially removed 
Saddam’s ability to maintain his grip on the mosques, mosques “were the only institution, 
 
25 Faleh A. Jabar, “Postconflict Iraq A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy,” Special 
Report 120, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, May 2004), 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr120.pdf (accessed 22 October 2006), 9. 
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apart from the tribes, relatively immune to regime and party control.  They became the 
natural place for people in search of an alternative to the Ba’th to pass their free time.”26  
To a large degree, this resulted from Saddam’s destruction of Iraq’s civil society.  With 
no viable social networks besides the Party, Iraqis had few options for alternative 
expression and the mosque welcomed them into the Islamic social network.  As Ayyash 
al-Kubaysi of the Muslim Ulema Council explains, the mosque basically reared many of 
Iraq’s young men.27
From a social movement theory perspective, mosques provided mobilizing space, 
offering psychological and physical space for religious men to organize and to discuss 
religious ideas in more depth than simply attending Friday prayers.  In any identity, such 
mobilizing spaces impart specific characteristics to the construction.28  For example, 
young Iraqis creating social networks at Ba’ath Party functions will absorb different traits 
into their identities than Iraqis gathering in mosques, regardless of the views of the 
individuals involved.  Since the mosque was the only alternative to the Party available to 
these Iraqis, they mobilized under the rubric and in the mobilizing spaces of Islam.  This 
phenomenon can give strength to the identity that extends beyond the movement and 
partially explains why some Sunnis simply found refuge in Islam and others turned to 
fundamentalist Islam.  During this time, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood began 
spreading its philosophy in Iraq’s mosques.  Al-Kubaysi claims that underground Sunni 
fundamentalist movements existed during this time, although Baram questions the 
validity of this assertion.29  Whether it occurred before or after Saddam’s fall, however, 
fundamentalist Islam worked its way into the collective identity of some Sunnis in Iraq, 
and a portion of Iraq's insurgents since 2003 claim to be fighting for fundamentalist 
causes.  According to standard Muslim Brotherhood philosophy, these insurgents claim 
that the source of society’s ills is the failure to observe true Islamic practices and prohibit 
religious innovations.  Therefore, the Islamization of Iraqi society is the path to solving 
society’s problems and the goal of these fundamentalists.  Although this goal may be 
 
26 Baram, Who Are the Insurgents? 
27 Ibid. 
28 McAdam, et al., 3. 
29 Baram, Who Are the Insurgents? 
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pure, however, the increased Islamization of Iraqi society has not been accompanied by 
improved security, “partly because the borders between religious militias and criminal 
gangs are often blurred, even more so when both sides belong to the same tribe.”30
 
2. Geography 
In addition to religion, geography and ethnicity played important roles in 
constructing the Iraqi Sunni identity.  The Sunnis are the dominant group in the oft-cited 
“Sunni Triangle,” roughly encompassing Tikrit in the North, Ramadi in the West, and 
Baghdad in the East.  The Shi’a, which account for approximately 60% of Iraq’s 
population today, are concentrated in the Southeast portion of the country.31  The Kurds 
in the North are a Sunni group with an ethnic stock distinct from the Arabs.  This 
geographic segregation not only caused each group to rely more heavily on its own 
members for daily interactions, but also allowed government policies to target specific 
groups, such as when Saddam Hussein began draining Southern Iraq’s marshes in an 
effort to disrupt the Shi’a lifestyle and economic viability. 
During the Ottoman conquest, the Shi’a Safavids repeatedly battled the Ottomans 
for control over the region, until Sultan Murat IV finally secured Baghdad in 1638.  
Although the region contained the port city of Basra, the intensity of the battle for this 
region implies that it held a greater significance than simply economic access.  The 
territory became a symbol of the struggle for supremacy between Ottoman Sunnism and 
Safavid Shi’ism.  Additionally, the land itself was a strong cultural symbol for both sides.  
For the Sunnis, Baghdad was the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate for 500 years, and 
represented the Golden Age that Sunnis wished to perpetuate.  For the Safavids, Iraq was 
home to two of the most revered shrines in Shi’ism; the center of Shi’a theology was in 
Najaf, and Karbala was the site of Imam Husayn’s martyrdom.  Given the significance of 
the region to both cultures, the battles created sectarian divisions that would arise 
 
30 Walter Posch, “A majority ignored: the Arabs in Iraq,” in Looking Into Iraq, ed. Walter Posch 
(Paris: Institute for Security Studies, July 2005), http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai79.pdf#search=%22posch%20%22looking%20into%20Iraq%22%22 (accessed 6 
October 2006), 30. 
31 A. William Samii, “Shi’a Political Alternatives in Postwar Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council 
Journal 10, no. 2 (Summer 2003), http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol10/0306_samii.asp (accessed 30 
November 2006). 
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throughout Iraq’s history.  Even though a majority of Iraqis converted to Shi’ism, the 
land remained under Ottoman control, and the idea that Sunnism triumphed over Shi’ism 
(and was therefore superior) entered the narrative of the Sunni identity.32
 
3. Governing Structures 
In addition to geographic issues, however, the region’s governing policies also 
contributed to Sunni identity.  A key aspect of Sunni identity is based upon the fact that 
the Mesopotamian region has been ruled by Sunnis since the Ottomans conquered 
Baghdad.  Under the Ottomans, this region was ruled as three separate provinces 
reflecting the composition of these identity groups.  The northern province of Mosul had 
economic links to Greater Syria and was dominated by Kurds, while the Sunnis in the 
Baghdad region relied mainly on agriculture and trade with Iran, and the Shi’a in Basra 
had economic ties to the Persian Gulf and India.33  Although some intermingling 
occurred, these areas were relatively homogenous for many years. 
The end of World War I brought the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 1920 
British mandate to govern Iraq.  Unfortunately, the British officials creating new Arab 
states from the fallen Empire did not fully consider the impact of the arbitrary boundaries 
they assigned.  In Iraq’s case, the British combined the Mosul, Baghdad and Basra 
regions into a single administrative unit that did not represent a political community in 
any sense of the term.  This new “state” of Iraq constituted one of the most ethnically and 
religiously diverse Arab regions of the old Ottoman Empire.  Forcing the Sunni Arabs, 
the Shi’a and the Kurds to live under a single government in an arbitrary political 
construct gave rise to substantial obstacles for stability and governance that still present 
themselves today.34
Furthermore, the British strengthened the Sunni collective identity in their 
colonial rule by implementing their standard governing tactics: prop up the minority to 
suppress and rule the majority.  Throughout most of Britain’s colonies, this procedure 
 
32 William J. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 
2004), 55-56.
33 Ibid., 204. 
34 Ibid. 
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emphasized the adversarial relationship between the governed identity groups.  Under 
this policy, the minority Sunni Arabs received a disproportionate share of political and 
military power in modern Iraq, which empowered them to persecute the majority Shi’a 
population.35
While Britain maintained control over many key economic and political 
decisions, the fact that Sunnis have not been ruled by Shi’a since the Safavid empire 
forms a key foundation for their modern identity.  Eric Davis strengthens this view by 
pointing to attempts by Sunni elites to shape Iraqi historical memory to benefit their own 
specific ethnic group or tribal clan.  Davis claims that “[t]he traditional Sunni Arab 
leadership that supported Pan-Arabism fostered a parochial and chauvinistic historical 
memory to prevent cross-ethnic solidarity from threatening its historical prerogatives 
[emphasis added].”36
These actions attempted to reinforce the Sunni collective identity while 
undermining that of the Shi’a and Kurds.  However, collective identities are often 
consolidated in opposition to other identities.  Targeting individuals as part of an identity 
group creates more solidarity with that identity, so these efforts had the unintended 
consequence of strengthening the Shi’a and Kurdish identities.  Algeria in the 1960s 
provides an excellent example.  The Islamic Salvation Front galvanized the Muslim’s 
collective identity by causing the French to overreact and indiscriminately target their 
identity group with extreme repression.  This ethnic profiling strengthened the collective 
identity and motivated its members to high-risk action to remedy an unjust situation, and 
this historical lesson should not be ignored in Iraq.  Many Sunni moderates may believe 
that the answer to stability lies in cooperation with the new government, but continued 
targeting by Shi’a can easily cause them to sympathize with the more radical Sunnis who 
are protecting Sunni interests.  
The Sunni position of power was most pronounced and brutal during Saddam 
Hussein’s dictatorial regime.  On one hand, Hussein strengthened the power of Sunni 
 
35 This persecution continued through monarchies and military rulers until the fall of Saddam Hussein 
in 2003, and is largely responsible for fueling the Shi’a insurgency led by Moqtada al-Sadr shortly after the 
U.S. toppled Hussein’s regime. 
36 Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 21. 
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tribes by providing jobs, power and prestige to the Sunni tribes in return for 
unquestioning loyalty.  Although some Shi’a were co-opted into the Hussein government 
in an effort to secure Shi’a loyalty and keep a close watch on the population, the Sunnis 
were the major benefactors of power in Hussein’s regime. 
On the other hand, when the Ba’ath Party rose to power in 1968 the leaders 
sought to suppress any loyalties other than to the Ba’ath.  The Ba’athists succeeded in 
creating a one-party state and extending Ba’athist influence into all aspects of Iraqi 
society.  As Cleveland explains, “[l]abor unions, student federations, and women’s 
groups all came under party control.  The officer corps was also brought within the orbit 
of the party, and promotion was determined by party membership.”37  As a symbol of the 
Party’s power, in 1977 Saddam formally removed all distinctions between party and state 
by extending membership in the Revolutionary Command Council to all members of the 
Ba’athist ruling council.38  In other words, the Ba’ath tried to replace the disparate 
identity groups with a single collective identity loyal to the Ba’ath and its leaders. 
After the first gulf war and the resulting sanctions, however, Hussein could not 
afford to provide the government services that bought the tribes’ loyalties.  At this point, 
he returned to previous identity constructs to maintain stability: tribal leaders and Islam.  
This reversal of policy created a patronage system whereby Saddam bought loyalty from 
the sheikhs and offered more freedom for religious access than he had before 1991. 
 
4. Shared Historical Memory 
Religious, ethnic and geographic divisions, coupled with an entrenched power 
structure built over an extended period of time, allowed the Sunnis to strengthen a 
collective identity by creating a shared historical memory.  This historical memory 
created an imagined community in which Sunnis were the rightful superiors over the 
other groups in the region.  The tension between Iraqi nationalism and pan-Arabism 
presented the modern vestiges of the attempt to create a shared historical memory. 
 
37 Cleveland, 409-10. 
38 Ibid., 410. 
22 
                                                
Between 1921 and 1958, the political elite in Iraq reinforced the differences 
between nationalism and pan-Arabism.  Because the Iraqi nation was new, pan-Arabists 
could mobilize the existing historical memory more effectively than the nationalists, and 
their ability to romanticize the past helped them gain support for the pan-Arab version of 
Iraq’s historical memory.  However, this memory was shaped by the Sunni political elite 
to strengthen their identity, and the Shi’a and Kurds therefore viewed pan-Arabism as 
another instrument for political, economic and cultural exclusion.39
Continuing this effort, the Takriti Ba’ath Sunnis empowered by Saddam 
attempted to base the Iraqi narrative upon an “historical imaginary [more so] than on an 
ideological formulation of the contours of the contemporary nation-state.”40  As a key 
feature of the Sunni identity, this imaginary focused emphatically upon the Arab Golden 
Age of the Abbasid Empire (750-1258CE), and suggested parallels between past 
greatness and the magnificence that Ba’athist Sunnis would bring to Iraq.  It also 
provided another example of the ethnicization of Iraqi history and sought to promote 
distrust among Iraq’s major ethnic groups.41
 
C. THE EFFECTS OF OPPOSITION 
One additional aspect of identity warrants further attention.  As Schwedler 
explains, identity is impacted by an individual’s position within complex social networks, 
and different identities can vary in prominence depending on the situation.42  This gives 
rise to two important factors.  First, identity is cemented in opposition to other identities.  
For example,  
the salience of Bosnian Muslim identity...increased dramatically when 
Bosnians were collectively targeted beginning in 1992.  This collective 






39 Davis, 55. 
40 Ibid., 3. 
41 Ibid., 3-4. 
42 Schwedler, 4-5. 
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religion; rather, Bosnians’ identity as Muslims emerged in response to 
extraordinary political circumstances in which their survival as a group of 
Muslims was at stake.43
In this view, the importance of a specific identity changes in response to external factors.  
More specifically, identities become necessary when a group is opposed by another group 
in the quest for resources – whether the resource is money, water rights or physical safety 
– and identities are cemented when threatened by crisis. 
Even in modern times, Iraq has experienced crises that cemented the salience of 
Sunni identity in opposition to the country’s Shi’a groups.  For example, the 1991 Shi’a 
uprising in southern Iraq threatened the entrenched Sunni power structure in Baghdad.  
To many Sunnis, this threat underscored the divide between the two groups and 
illustrated the benefits of loyalty to the in-group.  More acutely, the insurgency raging 
today is increasingly becoming Sunni versus Shi’a sectarian violence, whereby an 
individual’s safest calculation for survival depends on loyalty to his identity group. 
Secondly, this highlights the nature of competing identities.  If an individual 
simultaneously holds several identities, situations can arise that put these identities in 
conflict with each other.  A father may have to choose between meeting his family’s 
needs and fighting in the insurgency, for example.  An insurgent may be conflicted over 
the effectiveness of targeting civilians and the view of the Qur’an on this topic, reflecting 
competition between his identities as a militant and what he views as a good Muslim.  
When identified correctly, these competing identities can be leveraged to promote 
stability in Iraq. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, although the group evokes a religious foundation by calling itself 
Sunni, its current identity is also based upon many secular factors.  Geography had a 
tremendous impact by setting the stage for a battle between Sunni Ottomans and Shi’a 
Safavids, in which the Sunnis gained and held power for almost five centuries.  The 
British colonist’s custom of propping up the minority Sunnis to suppress the Shi’a 
reinforced the idea that Sunni rule was divinely inspired or blessed.  In addition to British 
 
43 Schwedler, 4. 
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practices, domestic Iraqi regimes instituted policies to ensure continued Sunni elites 
remained in power and ethnicized the Iraqi narrative to emphasize the Abbasid Golden 
age and minimize the role of Iraq’s other identity groups. 
Following Saddam’s overthrow, however, these Sunnis lost their connections with 
the power and prestige of the old regime.  For the first time since 1638, Iraq’s Sunnis did 
not rule their homeland.  In addition to the economic loss of Saddam’s patronage, many 
Sunni tribesmen suffered from loss of income as the Coalition endeavored to enhance 
stability by eliminating cross-border smuggling.  This reversal of fortune strengthened the 
collective identity further by fostering a desire to regain the Sunni’s rightful position in 
government and society, to restore lost prestige and income, and to protect Sunnis from 
potential power abuses by the more numerous Shi’a in the new governing system.  These 
grievances will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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III. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
In this chapter, I apply one particular aspect of social movement theory to help 
explain the emergence of the Sunni insurgency – political opportunity.  The structures in 
place immediately following Iraq’s regime change drastically altered the political 
opportunity structure of the country and alienated many Iraqis.  In particular, Sunnis were 
forced to cede a measure of power to the Shi’a and Kurds, and the lack of strong 
governmental control afforded the insurgents an opportunity to mobilize to violently 
oppose the Coalition and the new Iraqi government. 
After a short overview of political opportunity as it pertains to SMT, I briefly 
review the body of literature regarding this topic in Iraq, reconciling the broad-based 
structural framework with the specific realities on the ground in Iraq – loss of status, 
power and income; lack of representation in the new government; and physical insecurity 
based largely on the fear of violent Shi’a reprisals.  I conclude that while non-violent 
participation was possible for the Sunnis shortly after Saddam’s overthrow, many Sunnis 
either did not believe this was the case or were threatened to avoid participation in the 
new government.  Therefore, a rational analysis of the situation led insurgent leaders to 
conclude that violence would best protect their interests. 
 
A. DEFINING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
Doug McAdam, et al., explain that the work of Charles Tilly (1978), Doug 
McAdam (1982), and Sidney Tarrow (1983) firmly established the link between 
institutionalized politics and social movements.44  According to Tilly, opportunity 
defines the relationship between the group and its external environment.  No matter how 
well organized a group is, it cannot mobilize without the opportunity or freedom to 
assemble, if only in secrecy.45
During this time, however, the Europeans adopted a different approach to political 
opportunity structures.  While Americans examined the emergence of social movements 
 
44 McAdam, et al., 2. 
45 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 7. 
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based on changes in a system’s structure, Europeans tried to explain how differences in 
political characteristics of nation states affected the success or failure of movements.  In 
other words, Americans wanted to know why movements developed while Europeans 
wanted to understand why they succeeded.  Both aspects, however, are “guided by the 
same underlying conviction: that social movements and revolutions are shaped by the 
broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in 
which they are embedded.”46  Combining these frameworks, this chapter addresses both 
why the Iraqi insurgency arose and what political conditions allowed it to organize and 
operate. 
For this thesis, I define political opportunity as the structures and conditions, both 
formal and informal, available to a particular group at a specific point in time.  As 
political structures change, or fail to change to accommodate expectations, political 
grievances may arise.  When these grievances are not addressed, a group may begin to 
organize to resolve the issues.  The political space available for a group to organize and 
operate, or the permissiveness of its environment, is also a function of its political 
opportunity. 
This chapter examines the political opportunity structures that set the stage for the 
Sunni insurgency, but provides only a brief overview of the specific grievances that 
motivated the insurgency.  One particular difficulty in examining this issue is that a 
single insurgent may have several grievances that motivates his or her participation, and 
may profess allegiance to multiple mobilizing structures that fight for distinct goals.  To 
explain this issue more precisely as it pertains to individual motivations, I disaggregate 
the grievances overviewed in this chapter into more specific grievances and goals in the 
Mobilizing Structures chapter. 
 
B. THEORY AND STRUCTURE 
The literature describing political opportunity varies from macro-level 
explanations of the causes of instability to very detailed descriptions of how structural 
concerns affect insurgent perceptions of political opportunity in Iraq’s Sunni insurgency.  
 
46 McAdam, et al., 2-3. 
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Generally, this literature can be divided into two groups: rational, which focuses on the 
relationship between violence and political and economic grievances, such as inequality, 
poverty, illiteracy or lack of democracy; and cultural, which focuses on the difference 
between the values and beliefs of terrorists and their targets.47  Social movement theory 
provides a model that blends these two approaches, asserting that political opportunity is 
only one aspect that aids in establishing the causal and procedural links between political 
grievances and violent collective action. 
Beginning at the structural level, Tilly explains that Western powers followed a 
brutal path towards the stability they enjoy today.  He claims that war is absolutely 
central to state-making, and warfare caused the European states to perform four essential 
functions that resulted in strong, stable states: eliminating or neutralizing external rivals 
(war-making), eliminating or neutralizing internal rivals (state-making), protection 
(eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients, often providing both the threat 
and the protection), and extraction (acquiring the means to carry out the first three 
objectives).48  The implication of this process is a direct challenge to the social contract 
theory: Western states are more stable than many of today’s lesser developed states 
because they were allowed to fight it out.  Borders were created based on the force to 
defend them and internal rivals were crushed without fear of international intervention. 
In contrast, today’s Middle Eastern states were never afforded the opportunity to 
secure their stability through force.  Additionally, European states did not have to 
contend with the effects of globalization.  Today, advanced industrialized states have an 
interest in the resources of Middle Eastern states, and thus an interest in their internal 
functioning.  Therefore, unlike during the formative period of European statehood, in the 
Middle East intervention from powerful foreign nations suppressed internal uprisings, 
and most borders were created rather arbitrarily in the early 1900s without regard to 
social norms or identity groups.  Protection and threat were provided by the colonizers, 
and extractive institutions were organized to benefit the colonizers rather than to ensure 
 
47 Michael Mousseau, “Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror,” International Security (Winter 
2002/03): 27. 
48 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” in Bringing The State Back In, 
ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, (Cambridge: Cambridge  University Press, 
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state stability.  Furthermore, the colonizers often propped up a minority group to 
administer the population, which increased the impediment to self-governing stability.  
Ian Lustic claims that  
the system of colonial subordination and externally enforced norms to 
which nineteenth and twentieth century Middle East was subjected did not 
allow cross-border warfare by local rulers to effect substantial change in 
the number, size, or internal regimes of states. 
My claim is that these historical sequence-linked differences in the 
geopolitical context of European and Middle Eastern state system 
development constitute not the only but the single most important 
explanation for the contemporary absence of a Middle Eastern great 
power.49   
Preventing the rise of a great power is only one symptom of the current geopolitical 
construct; the same differences in the developmental paths of Western powers and 
Middle Eastern states are detrimental to internal stability.  Just as Alexander 
Gerschenkron argued that competition from industrialized nations prevented latecomers 
from achieving industrialization through free market capitalism,50 latecomers to state-
building cannot follow the same path to development as their predecessors in the West.  
Applying this argument to Iraq, since the creation of the Iraqi state foreign powers have 
interfered with the violent process of building internal stability, with the consequence of 
leaving Iraq as an unstable state with rather arbitrary borders encompassing at least three 
distinct identity groups: the Sunnis, the Shi’a and the Kurds.  In this sense, Iraq is a state 
but not a nation, and this fact necessarily impacts calculations of political opportunity for 
its citizens. 
Throughout his rule, Saddam tried to create the cohesive identity necessary for 
stability.  During the 1990s, he “fostered images of a renascent Iraq ready to exploit its 
political stability, economic resources, substantial population, and close ties with the 
Soviet bloc for the benefit of the Arab world as a whole,”51 but these ambitions were cut 
short by war with Iran, the American-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, and finally 
 
49 Ian S. Lustic, “The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in 
Historical Perspective,” International Organization 51:4 (Autumn 1997): 657. 
50 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962). 
51 Lustic, 671. 
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brought to an end by the 2003 invasion that removed Saddam from power.  Specifically 
applied to today’s internal conflict, Iraq’s insurgents openly claim that the Coalition’s 
imperialist actions to prevent their battle for power are a primary foundation for their 
perceptions of political opportunity in Iraq.  Not only did the Coalition drastically alter 
the functioning political construct by toppling the regime, but Coalition actions after 
Saddam’s fall directly influenced the opportunity to organize for collective action, both 
violently and non-violently.  In effect, political opportunity for the future of Iraq includes 
the inability to fight it out to stability as Western powers did. 
Furthermore, American decision-makers seemingly believed that Iraqis would 
welcome the political changes resulting from Saddam’s removal and did not plan for 
sustained, organized violence in opposition to the Coalition’s plans.  Disregarding the 
inadequate attention paid to Iraq’s disparate identity groups and how each would accept 
the new structures, many analysts pointed to Germany and Japan as examples of how 
military force can spread democracy and lead to a stable, functioning government.  These 
examples reflect a tremendous selection bias, however, and Eva Bellin provides 
outstanding insight into why the political opportunity structures in Iraq are not conducive 
to such plans: 
Germany and Japan began with a set of endowments, many of them 
anticipated by democratic theory, but others peculiar to the cases’ unique 
historical context and time, that favored democratic outcomes. These 
endowments are not replicated in Iraq, nor does military occupation 
guarantee them elsewhere.52
Bellin provides several examples of the differences in endowments that limit Coalition 
efforts to promote stability; three pertain to the discussion of political opportunities.  
First, Germany and Japan both had industrialized economies and retained post-war 
human, organizational, and social capital (skilled workers, skilled managers, and social 
networks).  Iraq never achieved such a level of economic development.  Second, 
Germany and Japan were much more ethnically homogenous and enjoyed consensus on 
national identity and social solidarity, so they had no need for “nation building.”  Iraq is 
fractured along ethnic and religious lines, and each groups’ view of the “nation” varies.  
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Last, Germany and Japan had traditions of efficient, meritocratically organized state 
institutions, and many of these institutions remained in place after the war.  In contrast, 
Iraq relied on Saddam’s patronage system, which fell apart with the regime.53  These 
endowments necessarily affect Sunni calculations of political opportunity, and explain 
the structural circumstances that gave rise to Sunni opposition. 
After examining such broad-based structural causes of instability, I now narrow 
the focus to political violence and highlight Michael Mousseau’s research: political 
violence originates from a conflict in the “values and beliefs associated with the mixed 
economies of developing countries in a globalizing world.”54  He explains that two types 
of economies are coming into conflict – market economies and clientalist economies.  In 
the West, market economies are  
founded in agreement on fundamental principles: how the world should be 
organized—politically, economically, and socially—and what constitutes 
proper governmental behavior both internally and externally. When 
differences surface among market democracies, the discourse is bounded 
by mutual respect for state rights (equity) and the primacy of international 
law—just as the domestic political behavior of the governments of these 
democracies is culturally bounded by respect for individual rights and the 
primacy of democratic law.55
Clientalist economies, by contrast, are based on explicit social linkages, such as kinship 
and ethnicity, and these linkages render in-groups more important than out-groups.  
Societies based on clientalist economies are organized hierarchically, with patrons 
receiving gifts from clients as expressions of loyalty, and in exchange for life-long 
protection.  By implication, these communities are more inward looking than market 
communities in terms of identity, values, and beliefs.  When market values clash with a 
clientalist society, however, that society’s economic norms diverge from prevailing 
cultural values and beliefs.  This causes clientalist linkages to break down, necessarily 
threatening the patrons’ power, but without allowing enough time for market values to 
permeate society.  “During this period of social anarchy,” Mousseau explains, “a zero-
sum culture may emerge in which strangers pursue their interests without any regard for 
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shared values—market or clientalist.”56  This period of zero-sum conflict, during the 
transition from clientalist to market values in society, provides the grievances and often 
the perceived opportunity for violent political expression. 
The Hussein regime possessed characteristics of both modernizing autocracy and 
a tribal society, but the overthrow and expectation of immediate shift to democracy 
necessarily caused a clash between the American expectations of a pluralistic society and 
the values entrenched in Iraqi society, compounded by the fact that Iraqis had no previous 
experience with democracy or with representative government and societal structures.57  
Steven Metz enhances this argument by stating that, “moving from the psychology of 
totalitarianism to the psychology of an open society, with its foundations in political 
initiative, consensus building, and compromise, is a long and tortuous journey.”58  
Furthermore, the struggle between market values of the West and the clientalist values of 
Iraq’s patronage system causes some groups to lose power, and this loss is viewed as a 
threat to their political opportunity. 
This explains the structure of political opportunity available to Iraqis at the time 
of the invasion.  Iraq was a state ready to be divided by simmering ethnic hostilities but 
kept in check by an oppressive government, and after the invasion the United States 
imposed a set of expectations that Iraqis had neither the resources nor the skills to meet.  
However, these circumstances do not explain the specific grievances of the Sunni 
insurgents, or why they chose insurgency and terrorist tactics to express their opposition. 
 
C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY IN IRAQ – GRIEVANCES AND SPACE 
While individual insurgents fight to address many varied grievances, three 
common themes permeate the insurgent motivations.  First, individuals and groups 
favored by Saddam lost a great deal of status and prestige with his overthrow.  In many 
cases, political power and a source of income accompanied this loss in status.  Next, 
many Sunnis feared that their interests would not be secured in the new government.   
56 Mousseau, 15. 
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This lack of representation led them to conclude that violence was a more effective 
method of ensuring that Sunnis had a voice in the new governing process.  Lastly, the 
Coalition’s inability to stem the looting that began shortly after Baghdad’s capture 
illustrated to the Sunnis that the Coalition could not protect them from expected Shi’a 
reprisals.  Therefore, fear and physical insecurity dictated that Sunnis arm themselves and 
prepare for violent action against an impending threat.  This section examines each of 
these grievances in detail. 
 
1. Grievances – Loss of Status, Power and Income 
The most acute grievance affecting Iraq’s Sunni population after Saddam’s fall is 
the loss of status, power and income.  Although Saddam offered some governmental 
positions to influential Shi’a in an effort to control the Shi’a population, his government 
favored Sunnis.  As a result, more Sunnis than Shi’a tended to be in positions of power.  
Additionally, after the economic hardships of the Iran-Iraq war and the sanctions 
following the first Gulf War, Saddam turned to Iraq’s tribes to distribute oil rents and 
control the population.  With his fall, these individuals and groups lost their influence 
over society and government, and this sudden decrease in importance provided a major 
impetus to regain what they lost.  This grievance in particular has a different affect upon 
each group in the Sunni insurgency, so I will examine it in greater detail in Mobilizing 
Structures chapter. 
However, some commonalities still exist.  The most oft-cited examples of Sunni 
grievances are Ambassador L. Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
Order #1, De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society, and Order #2, Dissolution of Entities.  
While many strategists would concede that ideological leaders within the Ba’ath Party 
should not be returned to government posts, Order #1 cut much deeper into Iraqi society.  
Anyone could be expelled from government employment regardless of whether or not 
they were involved with the senior structure, including university and grade school 
teachers.  Furthermore, CPA Police Advisor Steven Casteel explains that most teachers 




                                                
greater than non-Ba’athist teachers, rather than for any ideological loyalty to the party.  
These indiscriminate cuts were applied across the spectrum of government 
employment.59
Order #1 had three major negative impacts.  Most importantly, such 
indiscriminate cuts unnecessarily stripped the Iraqi government of most employees with 
the experience needed to govern its society.  Without workers, the government could not 
perform basic services and society descended into chaos.  It also removed a large portion 
of Sunni inputs to government, leaving them with no voice and with few alternatives to 
violence.60  Lastly, Order #1 created a large pool of unemployed personnel who began to 
feel discontent that the newly established Coalition system left them without a means of 
income.   
The unemployment problem became much larger when Order #2 dissolved the 
military.  Upwards of 400,000 Iraqis, many of them young and possessing military 
experience and weapons, were now unemployed.  Most of these Iraqis viewed their 
service with honor and as a measure of their status, and after the Coalition victory many 
of them expected to be called back into service to maintain order and help with 
reconstruction.  In stark contrast to their expectations, however, they interpreted Order #2 
to imply that the Coalition did not value their participation and that their formerly 
honorable service was now a disqualifier for government employment.  Although 
Ambassador Bremer claims that Order #2 may be the “single correct decision we made 
while we were there,” former Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance Jay Garner believes that Order #2 was the single event that largely shifted the 
perception of the Coalition from liberators to occupiers.61
The CPA orders had severe economic impacts that were worsened by the policies 
that followed.  Citing security concerns, American contractors largely refrained from 
hiring local labor during reconstruction, although the inexpensive price of labor imported 
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from South Asia certainly played a role in their decisions.  Importing labor contributed to 
the unemployment problem, shunted the local business expertise and possibly increased 
the illegitimacy of the occupation forces.62  Additionally, the South Asian workers 
remitted these earnings to their home countries while American companies expatriated 
the profits rather than reinvesting into the Iraqi economy.  Khalid Medani claims that 
such economic and political difficulties are the true cause for Iraq’s instability, and the 
struggle takes on a regional or sectarian hue simply because these identities offer more 
security than supporting the Coalition.63
 
2. Grievances – Lack of Representation 
In his exploration into causes of revolutionary movements, Jeff Goodwin 
concludes that political violence is not simply a response to economic exploitation or 
inequality, although these provide common grievances, but is “more directly a response 
to political oppression and violence, typically brutal and indiscriminate.”64  After 
Saddam’s fall, many Sunnis feared that the new government would exclude them and that 
Shi’a reprisals would be brutal and indiscriminate.  For a short time after the fall, 
however, Jay Garner’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance provided 
opportunities for Sunni involvement in the new governing structures, and Sunnis were 
officially encouraged to create parties, to participate in both elections and to vote in the 
constitutional referendum.  How did this disconnect between participation and violence 
occur? 
Shortly after major combat operations ended, the Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance tried to establish a representative successor to Iraq’s 
government.  With White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (later Ambassador to Iraq), 
Garner organized meetings with hundreds of Iraqis of various views and ethnicities to lay 
the parameters for an interim administration.  In May 2003, however, Paul Bremer’s CPA 
was recognized by the United Nations as an occupying authority and the CPA subsumed 
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Garner’s duties, suspending his political overtures.  Bremer then appointed a 25-member 
Iraq Governing Council (IGC) that would not have sovereignty, and in September 2003 
the IGC created a 25-member cabinet to run Iraq’s ministries.  The IGC and cabinet had 
only slight majorities of Shi’a and some influential Sunni politicians emerged, illustrating 
the non-violent participation was possible.  Still, many Sunnis still resented the invasion 
and opposed the US-initiated government.65
Sunni participation in the elections is also a contested subject for the insurgents.  
Only 10 to 15 percent of the Sunni Arab population voted in the January 2005 elections, 
leaving Sunnis without a voice in the elected government.66  Before the elections, 
however, Sunni insurgents implemented counter-election strategy consisting of “attacks 
against voters, polling centers, election officials and candidates.  These actions, combined 
with open attempts to dissuade Sunni Arabs from voting, largely prevented the Sunnis 
from participating in the election.”67  Although the insurgents largely succeeded in 
making the January 2005 election appear invalid to Sunnis, the fact that they resorted to 
such drastic measures to discourage participation illustrates that many Sunnis were 
indeed willing to participate in non-violent political compromise in the newly forming 
government. 
Even with this participation, many Sunnis are hesitant to trust the new 
government.  Many believe that the Shi’a and Kurdish factions are controlled by the 
United States and Iran and that these factions dominate the government, so Sunni 
interests will not be protected.68  Indeed, many Sunnis speak of the Shia-dominated 
United Iraqi Alliance as “the Safavid government.”69  Abuses of power, such as the 
discovery of secret prisons run by the Shi’a-dominated Ministry of Interior where Sunnis 
were tortured, fuel the perceptions that the new government is making war on the  
65 Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security,” Congressional Research Service 
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Sunnis.70  For these reasons, “the Sunni Arab community is deeply divided over whether 
its future lies with the insurgency, the political process, or a combination of the two.”71
 
3. Grievances and Space – The Effects of Looting and Fear of Shi’a 
Reprisals 
The final major motivation for the insurgency is the fear of violent Shi’a reprisals.  
Following decades of Saddam’s oppression, the Sunnis feared that the Shi’a were waiting 
to exact revenge for injustices by Saddam’s forces.  In many cases they were correct; 
accounts of reprisal, whether perpetrated by government-endorsed Shi’a forces or by 
independent organizations like Moqtada al-Sadr’s forces, are not uncommon.72  This fear 
alone is not a sufficient grievance to motivate an insurgency, but placed in the context of 
the widespread looting that occurred almost immediately after the fall of Baghdad it 
becomes a more salient issue. 
For several days after Coalition forces toppled Hussein’s regime, many of 
Baghdad’s citizens looted government ministry buildings, stockpiles of basic survival 
supplies, and even national archives and museums.  Ambassador Barbara Bodine 
describes the chaos following Baghdad’s fall as evolving from looting to unstructured 
crime, to structured crime, and one “could probably even do a DNA chain to the 
insurgency.  That was the spark.”73  No authority existed in Iraq at the time to quell the 
looting and restore order. 
While the link between looting and the insurgency is not causative as Ambassador 
Bodine’s comment suggests, it is a salient link nonetheless.  The Coalition’s inability to 
maintain order highlighted two key issues to Sunni leaders.  First, the Coalition was not 
able to protect them from Shi’a reprisals, so Sunnis needed to mobilize to protect 
themselves.  Second, if the Coalition could not maintain order, then the Sunnis had the 
political space to mobilize against both the Shi’a and the Coalition.  This political space 
is a necessary condition to insurgency. 
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Erica Chenoweth’s research supports this argument.  She posits that instability 
does not cause such violence, but violent actors simply take advantage of the opportunity.  
According to her analysis,  
the political stability of the existing regime is the most significant factor 
affecting the origins of terrorism....The essential argument is that the 
“permissive conditions” of politically unstable regimes inhibit domestic 
institutional mechanisms that could potentially prevent terrorist 
organizations from taking root in particular countries.74
Although her research specifically describes terrorism, this conclusion remains a valid 
description of the physical and political space necessary all political violence.  Unstable 
systems, such as Iraq after the Saddam fell, become permissive environments because no 
agency exists to enforce laws and norms, to hold individuals accountable for 
transgressions, or even to monitor violent actions.  In this environment, insurgents are 
simply political actors responding to a lack of political order.  In short, insurgencies 
develop only when the political opportunity to organize exists, just as “terrorism develops 
wherever it can.”75  One important implication of Chenoweth’s analysis is that political 




Ambassador James Dobbins, Former Assistant Secretary of State, stated that 
shortly after Saddam’s overthrow, “the Iraqi people were at least open-minded and 
prepared to work with the United States, and optimistic about the future.  And that has 
largely been lost....”76  Considering the participation in Jay Garner’s first meetings with 
multi-ethnic and multi-factional Iraqis, and the fact that insurgents felt the need to wage 
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were willing to participate in the new government.  Over time, however, this good will 
was lost and many Sunnis came to believe that their interests would be best secured  
by violently opposing the new government. 
Explanations of political opportunity structures provide a very important 
foundation for explaining the emergence of the insurgency in Iraq, but such explanations 
are not complete in and of themselves.  The Coalition’s de-Ba’athification regime and the 
dissolution of the armed forces merely set the conditions and provide the grievances.  
Authors claiming that these two orders or the Sunnis’ loss of status and influence are the 
causes of the insurgency fail to provide a mechanism for transforming these conditions 
and grievances into collective action.  In this chapter, I have provided the structural and 
political conditions under which the insurgency rose, from the macro-historical level 
explaining why Iraq is not a cohesive nation to the three specific grievances that motivate 
the Sunni insurgents – loss of status, power and income; lack of representation in the new 
government; and fear of Shi’a reprisals.  In the next chapters, I explain how these 
conditions and grievances are used to motivate the collective action that became the 
Sunni insurgency in Iraq.  
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IV. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
Integral to ending the insurgency is addressing the fighters’ political grievances, 
which can only be done once an adequate categorization of them exists.  Understanding 
the origins and structure of these forces provides a step in the direction of finding a 
solution to end the violence.  I attempt such a categorization in this chapter by applying 
SMT’s concept of mobilizing structures.  After a short overview of the theory, I briefly 
review the literature on the identity of Iraq’s insurgents, which varies in the 
categorization according to origin, ideology, goals and religious views.  I found no 
existing categorization strategy that was both complete and useful for crafting strategies 
to ending the insurgency.  Instead, I present a new model that will provide superior 
insight into the essential characteristics of the insurgent groups.   
The criteria for establishing categories have very important policy implications.  
Most importantly, groups that are candidates for rapprochement should be targeted with 
incentives for cooperation, while groups that cannot be co-opted should be isolated and 
defeated.  Further, if candidates for rapprochement are differentiated by goals, it may be 
possible for the Iraqi government to reduce the insurgency by adjusting policies and 
appealing to each group based on its goals.  Therefore, I distinguish among indigenous 
secularists, transnational secularists, indigenous Islamists and transnational Islamists.  
Every major Sunni insurgent group in Iraq fits into one of these categories, and 
organizing them in this fashion will allow an effective counterstrategy to be created.  This 
categorization facilitates targeted policies for each group according to their particular 
characteristics. 
 
A. THE THEORY OF MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
According to Charles Tilly, collective action requires four components: 
organization, mobilization, opportunity, and the action itself.  In this framework, 
organization is the group’s structure, and most directly affects its ability to act on its 
interests, while mobilization is the process by which the group acquires collective control 
over the resources needed for action.  Opportunity defines the relationship between the 
40 
                                                
group and its external environment, as addressed in the previous chapter.  Finally, he 
defines collective action as individuals working together towards a common goal.77  
Under this framework, this chapter will define mobilizing structures as the structures by 
which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action, including 
manpower, skills and repertoires.  These structures are then used to carry out the 
collective action, and necessarily influence the direction and tone of the activities and 
outcomes. 
Doug McAdam, et al., adopt a similar approach in defining mobilizing structures. 
“By mobilizing structures we mean those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, 
through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”78  They add an 
important feature to understanding mobilizing structures by submitting that “[i]f 
institutionalized political systems shape the prospects for collective action and the forms 
movements take, their influence is not independent of the various kinds of mobilizing 
structures through which groups seek to organize.”79  In other words, the essential 
characteristics present in a movement are necessarily affected by the vehicles, or 
mobilizing structures, used by that group in the formative stages of the movement.  
Furthermore, as external forces act upon the movement, these characteristics will adapt 
over time. 
In the context of Iraq, the opposition’s mobilizing structures during the 
insurgency’s formative period included groups that used institutionalized violence for 
conflict resolution and political manipulation. These are former military personnel, 
Saddam’s internal security forces, militant transnational Islamists, and criminals.  In part, 
this structure explains why the opposition turned violent so quickly.  With limited 
exposure to non-violent political resolution, but with years of experience in violent 
political manipulation, it should hardly come as a surprise that the opposition chose 
armed conflict to express its political opposition. 
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B. APPLYING THE THEORY TO IRAQ 
Shortly after the end of major combat operations in Iraq, Sunni and Shi’a fighters 
began attacking Coalition forces in small numbers.  What was initially a harassment to 
the Coalition eventually grew into a full-scale insurgency.  Over time the Shi’a 
population was appeased into relative calm by political inclusion in the new government, 
but Sunni Iraqi attacks have not abated.80  Today, the Coalition cannot even provide an 
accurate number of armed fighters in Iraq, but 20,000 seems to be a midpoint range 
including all types of insurgents.  Others number the Sunni insurgents and active 
sympathizers in the range of 15,000 to 60,000, with even greater numbers of passive 
sympathizers.81  Even on the low end of these estimates, the Sunni insurgents have 
created a permissive environment for hostile actions against Coalition and Iraqi forces 
that shows few signs of improving in the near term. 
As Jeremy Sharp explains, many critics point to the May 2003 decision to disband 
the Iraqi army, Order #2 – Dissolution of Entities, “as the single most important factor in 
destabilizing Iraq after the cessation of large scale military operations.”82  However, 
Timothy Haugh points out that  
It is trite at this point to label the Coalition Provisional Authority policies 
of de-Ba’athification and disbanding of the Iraqi Army as a cause of the 
insurgency.  Although these policies likely contributed recruits as foot 
soldiers, it is a certainty that the current suspected leaders of the Sunni 
groups would have been unwelcome in any future Iraqi society.83
According to Haugh, disbanding the Iraqi army did not cause the insurgency but likely 
had an impact on the mobilizing structures by increasing the number of unemployed 
persons in a country with no industry and by limiting the potential to use the disbanded 
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soldiers in other capacities supporting Coalition goals.  In his view, unemployment 
provided a major grievance to be addressed, and the insurgency is simply one avenue to 
remedy the problem for the insurgents.  While too many variables exist to empirically 
link Order #2 with the growth of the insurgency, “the lack of opportunity for unemployed 
Iraqis has created a market for anti-Coalition activities.”84  As evidence of this growing 
market, Haugh cites the 4th Infantry Division Commander, MG Raymond Odierno: 
When we first got here (October 2003), we believed it was about $100 to 
conduct an attack against coalition forces, and $500 if you’re successful. 
We now (March 2004) believe it’s somewhere between $1,000 and $2,000 
if you conduct an attack, and $3,000 to $5,000 if you’re successful.85
Since it is unclear whether the insurgency would have occurred without Order #2, one 
cannot assume that all insurgents are former soldiers or that their grievances stem directly 
from dismissal and unemployment. 
Who then are the insurgents and what are their goals and grievances?  Are they 
open to rapprochement and able to be assimilated into the functioning political discourse 
in the future?  Some general agreement on these issues exists in the literature, but with 
little precision in categorizing the groups and their goals. 
Amatzia Baram explains that profiling Sunni insurgents is difficult because 
demographic information is fragmented and the rebels are “marked more they their 
heterogeneity than by their homogeneity,” but some basic categories can be distilled.86  
He categorizes the insurgents by motivation and “identity-based impetuses,” narrowing 
the field to three groups.  The secularists/ideologues include former regime loyalists 
(FRLs), Ba’athists, Arab nationalists, and the like.  These secularists may or may not 
support Saddam Hussein, but generally want a return of their former power and prestige, 
and a protection of Sunni status for the future.  Tribes form a category of their own, and 
are defined by loyalty to their traditional tribal structure over ideology, government or 
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new government if their interests are guaranteed.  Islamists are Baram’s final category, 
but within this group he defines subsets of “moderate and radical” and “ultra-radical 
Salafis and Wahhabis.”87
Secondary to these categories, Baram suggests the insurgents can be divided 
based upon which groups can be co-opted into the new government.  Candidates in the 
first group include individuals who may lay down their arms if the new government can 
protect their interests in a fair manner without opening the country to Shi’a domination.  
Secular/ideological, tribal and moderate Islamists groups generally fall into this category.  
The second group consists of ultraradical  Islamists, former regime officials who have 
committed crimes against humanity or otherwise think they have no place in the new 
Iraq, and hardened criminals.  This group understands that its interests in no way align 
with a successful representative government and will not consider rapprochement as a 
viable alternative to fighting.88
After dividing the insurgency into Sunni, Shi’a and foreign terrorists, Timothy 
Haugh adopts a similar approach.  However, he refrains from characterizing indigenous 
groups as “essentially Sunni,” claiming that “[a] better description would be either 
opposition groups operating in traditionally Sunni areas, or groups representing Iraqis 
who are no longer in power.”89  The groups do not fit neatly into categories because each 
one is a complex mix of tribal, religious and Ba’athist influences.  Even so, Haugh 
categorizes the insurgent groups based upon ideology and structural grievances. 
Few articles provide an in-depth analysis of this topic in particular, but Mark 
Steliga provides an excellent analysis of insurgent groups in Iraq.  Echoing the general 
consensus of this body of literature, Steliga clarifies that “it is necessary to understand the 
Iraqi insurgency as a variety of different concurrent movements as opposed to one 
monolithic phenomenon.”90  He expands on this heterogeneity by explaining that the 
disparate groups share only two significant characteristics: 
 
87 Baram, Who Are the Insurgents? 
88 Ibid. 
89 Haugh. 
90 Mark Steliga, Lieutenant, USN, “Why They Hate Us: Disaggregating the Iraqi Insurgency” 
(Masters Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005), 3. 
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All of Iraq’s insurgent groups maintain an interest in expelling coalition 
forces, which are currently the only major hurdles between the insurgents 
and their goals of power, wealth, prestige, or ideological victory. In 
addition, all of Iraq’s insurgent groups have taken advantage of Iraq’s 
cities, using them as refuges, making the insurgency a largely urban 
phenomenon.91
With this warning, he divides the insurgency into Sunni, Shi’a and transnational 
categories, then further subdivides the Sunni insurgent groups into tribal insurgents, 
FRLs, Sunni nationalists, and Sunni Islamists.   
In his view, the tribal groups are concerned with regional power relative to 
neighboring tribes, while FRLs wish to reestablish the “old guard” in power or prevent 
the Shi’a from taking power.  After the capture of Saddam and many high-ranking 
Ba’athists, the FRLs became largely inactive and function only as financiers for other 
groups.  Iraqi nationalists simply want to expel the Coalition and reinstate Sunni Arabs as 
the premier political powers for the country.  The indigenous Sunni Islamists form 
Steliga’s final category, and he claims that indigenous Islamists have some fissures with 
the transnational jihadists.  Even so, they often provide the cohesion for indigenous 
secular groups to cooperate with transnational jihadists.92
Anthony Cordesman provides the final example of categorization that represents 
the body of literature.  He agrees that classifying the insurgent groups is difficult because 
of the highly sectarian and regional nature of the conflict, but describes the two major 
groups often used by intelligence, Coalition and Iraqi government experts.  First, the 
native Iraqi Sunni insurgents tend to be primarily nationalists who do not desire regional 
or global jihad, but simply seek the ability to influence events inside Iraq.  Their goal is 
to regain their former power, or at least a “fair share” of the power, and although they 
may be religious individuals a secular government under Sunni control is acceptable.  
“Anger, revenge, economic need, opposition to the US invasion and any government that 
grows out of it or sheer lack of hope in the current system” also motivate individuals in 
this category.93
 
91 Steliga, 2-3. 
92 Ibid., 4-5. 
93 Cordesman, 5. 
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Cordesman’s second category consists of Sunni neo-Salafi insurgents.  These 
groups, especially those led by hard-line figures like the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
fight to establish a regional Sunni puritanical caliphate with no presence of Christians or 
Jews, and in which other Muslim sects must convert to Salafism or be destroyed.  
Although many of these groups publicly deemphasize the takfiri nature94 of their 
ideology by identifying themselves as Iraqi rather than Salafi, some groups actively 
encourage such sectarian violence.95
Cordesman admits that this general categorization has severe limits.  For example, 
determining how many Iraqis support such extremists Islamist insurgents or how many 
transnationals influence the conflict remains practically impossible.  Furthermore, it 
remains unclear how many members actually support these groups’ ideologies and which 
members simply “act out of anger, misinformation, and/or a naïve search for 
martyrdom.”96  Regardless of such limits, Cordesman’s imprecise categorization 
represents a popular division of the insurgents between secularists and Islamists. 
 
C. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER: CATEGORIZING THE SUNNI 
INSURGENTS 
Examining the literature as a whole, the two most common criteria for 
categorization are secular versus Islamist and indigenous versus transnational.  However, 
none of the literature reviewed specifically used these categories to provide a complete 
picture of the Sunni insurgent groups, and none of the structures were parsimonious.  
Most importantly, although the current literature provides useful details and some 
categorization, no author offered an inclusive framework suitable for creating policy and 
finding solutions to the conflict. 
Using these secular versus Islamist and indigenous versus transnational criteria, I 
offer a categorization that includes every major Sunni insurgent group in Iraq.  This 
framework is parsimonious, easily applied to the policy sector, and will enhance the 
 
94 Takfiri generally refers to the practice of declaring an individual as a non-believer.  As used by 
Islamic extremists, labeling an individual takfir provides religious justification for killing him.  Salafists 
often label Shi’a Muslims takfir, which some groups in Iraq use to fuel the sectarian violence. 
95 Cordesman, 5. 
96 Ibid. 
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effort to create an effective counterstrategy.  A simple chart with a representative sample 
of groups in each category provides an overview. 
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Criminal Organizations 
 
Subset 2 – Foreign Nations 
 
 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
Ansar al-Sunna 
 
Table 1.   Inclusive Categorization of Sunni Insurgents 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, indigenous means individuals or groups who 
originated in Iraq and whose motivations and goals lie primarily within the nation-state of 
Iraq.  Transnational groups are organizations that have “sustained continuous interactions 
with opponents – national or non-national – by connected networks of challengers across 
national boundaries.”97  The differentiating characteristic between indigenous and 
transnational organizations is the target of loyalty; the loyalty of indigenous organization 
lies with or within Iraq’s boundaries, whereas the loyalty of transnational organizations 
transcends or ignores Iraq’s national boundaries. 
 Secular organizations either have no prevailing ideology, or an ideology that lies 
outside the purview of religion.  Islamist organizations define their basic identity by 
adherence to Islam, and justify any goals in religious terms.  Islamist organizations differ 
in level of radicalism, from moderates to ultraradical Salafis and Wahhabis. 
 
                                                 
97 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 184. 
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1. Group I – Indigenous Secularists 
Indigenous Secularists are likely the largest group of insurgents and include any 
homegrown Iraqi groups that have secular motivations and goals.  The first subset 
comprises insurgents with ideological motivations, such as former regime loyalists, 
Ba’athists, Iraqi nationalists, and pan-Arabists.  Because of the patently different goal of 
securing tribal power above state power, tribes form a separate subset within this group.  
Domestic Iraqi criminals generally lack any ideological agenda and form a small third 
subset in this group. 
Similar to Baram’s secularist/ideologues group, “[e]conomic, ideological, social 
and power-based secular interests largely motivate the insurgents belonging to this 
group.”98  Additionally, Iraq has a large youth population, and thousands of young, 
unemployed Iraqis have former military experience and access to weapons.  With an 
effective anti-occupation framing strategy, this creates a large recruiting pool for 
indigenous secularist insurgent groups.  Further worsening the problem, Hussein drafted 
plans prior to the invasion for a partisan insurgency.  Immediately after Baghdad fell, 
these former loyalists began resisting the occupation by using military stockpiles of arms 
and ammunition and, more importantly, an existing chain of command that transferred 
directly from the Ba’ath regime into the insurgent networks.99  In other words, the 
insurgents were prepared for operations while the Coalition was still basking in the glow 
of regime collapse. 
A few short months after the fall of Baghdad, multiple groups in this category had 
arisen, such as the General Command of the Armed Forces, Patriotic Front, and Iraqi 
Liberation Front, composed of former Ba’ath party members, Special Republican Guard 
units, former state security personnel, Iraqi intelligence personnel, and Hussein’s 
fedayeen paramilitary personnel.  Baram provides a longer list of such organizations, 
including al-‘Awda (The Return), al-Islah (The Reform), Jabhat al-Muqawama (The 
Resistance Front), Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-‘Iraqiyya (The Iraqi Liberation 
Organization), and Kata'ib Salah al-Din (Saladin Phalanx).100   
 
98 Baram.  Who Are The Insurgents? 
99 Steliga, 39-42. 
100 Baram.  Who Are The Insurgents? 
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These ideologues have grievances and goals that are generally straightforward and 
thoroughly discussed in the literature: anger and frustration over lost status and income, 
fear of Shi’a supremacy in the new government, and a desire to protect Sunni interests or 
return to a Sunni-dominated power structure in Iraq.  Initially, many of them were 
fighting either to return the Ba’athist regime to power or to create such a hostile 
environment that the Coalition would withdraw, but this goal became increasingly 
unrealistic.  As one fighter explains, “I did my military service in the Republican Guard, 
in the Tawakalna ala Allah division. Now we are not defending Saddam Hussein, but we 
are defending our city, Falluja.”101  
Most members of this subset are open to rapprochement.  With such 
straightforward goals, many of these individuals can be assured that their interests will be 
protected, that the Shi’a will not dominate the new government, and that they will not be 
targeted by the Shi’a-controlled state security agencies.  If these ideologues perceive that 
such policies are successfully implemented, many will eventually lay down their arms in 
hopes of a stable, functioning homeland. 
Tribes and tribal interests form the second subset of this group.  Although 
Saddam’s Ba’athist ideology demanded the dissolution of any political allegiance in Iraq 
other than his party, he rarely held true to this doctrine.  Even though he slowly embraced 
tribalism and its symbols from the beginning of his reign, his interaction with Iraq’s tribal 
history increased tremendously in the 1980s and 1990s.  Rather than eliminating sheikhs 
as symbols of political allegiance, Saddam manipulated them into loyalty by increasing 
their prestige and using the tribal system to distribute the state’s petrodollars, and then 
began sharing state power by tribalizing the state security services and even referring to 
the Ba’ath party itself as a tribe on at least one occasion.  Saddam even illustrated the 
apparent superiority of tribal customs over state law when he supported the honor killing 
of his sons-in-law by their tribe, even though he had pardoned them.102  With tribalism 
 
101 Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), “Iraqi & Arab Mujahideen Tell Al-Arabiya TV 
of the Wait List for Martyrdom Operations and Other Methods of ‘Destroying the Americans’” Special 
Dispatch Series no. 1040 (6 December 2005), 
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iraq&ID=SP104005 (accessed 13 October 2006). 
102 Amatzia Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies 1991-96,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 29, no. 1 (February 1997): 10-15. 
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remaining such an entrenched idea in Iraqi collective identity, falling back upon this 
traditional structure in a time of such crisis seems inevitable. 
This subset closely parallels the ideologues in regards to membership and 
grievances, as Gilles Kepel explains: 
The recurrent insurrection in the Sunni triangle northwest of the capital 
was perhaps understandable.  The fallen dictator had lavished payments 
upon this stronghold to ensure the loyalty of Arab Sunnis, who make up 
barely seventeen percent of the Iraqi population.103
Many tribes relied on these payments for income and prestige, and with Saddam’s fall 
these payments ended.  Furthermore, tribes often earned income by cross-border 
smuggling, but this has become much less lucrative as Coalition troops attempt to cut off 
all unregulated cross-border movement.  Additionally, Iraqi culture values the “tribal 
warrior tradition” and many tribesmen are honor-bound to avenge the death of a relative; 
in this case, Coalition success on the battlefield ignites tribal aggression and begins an 
unending cycle of violence.104  As Steliga explains, “America’s complete disregard for 
Iraq’s tribal structure and its political significance lead to the rise of multiple disjointed 
Sunni tribal insurgencies, intent on jockeying for power and adamant about not being 
disenfranchised by Iraq’s new government.”105
While the tribes’ grievances closely resemble the ideologues, their goals include 
protecting tribal power relative to neighboring tribes and other groups in the region, 
rather than supporting any functional national government.  On the contrary, any state 
authority will necessarily take power from tribal interests, so many tribal sheikhs have 
entrenched interests in thwarting a power greater than their tribe and its allies.  
Furthermore, their small size and the lack of cohesion for any broad-based tribal goals 
make this group extremely difficult to target with an effective counterinsurgency strategy.  
Even so, many tribes are still candidates for rapprochement if the coalition can find a 
solution that allows the tribe to save face without avenging a blood feud, and still 
addresses the tribe’s grievances regarding loss of income, power and prestige. 
 
103 Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
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The final subset of indigenous secularists is the criminal element.  Immediately 
before the invasion, Saddam released approximately 200,000 prisoners from Iraq’s 
prisons.106  These criminals blended with the local gangs, tribes, Islamists and newly 
formed insurgent groups, creating an environment of social lawlessness.  Since the 
Coalition has been largely ineffective at instilling law and order to large sections of Iraq’s 
cities, criminals have been free to disrupt the lives of everyday Iraqis and pressure them 
to comply with insurgents and gangs.107  The criminals do not have grievances that 
parallel those of ideologues or tribes, but they are interested in profiting from the unstable 
situation.  Since an orderly society would likely impinge on this goal, their interest lies in 
disrupting civil authorities and perpetuating an environment of chaos.  In general, 
hardened criminals are not open to rapprochement because an empowered national 
government would likely return them to prison. 
 
2. Group II – Transnational Secularists 
Transnational secularists are divided into two subsets: criminals and agents of 
foreign nations.  Transnational criminal organizations closely resemble indigenous 
criminal elements regarding grievances and goals, but they are generally involved in 
cross-border smuggling of supplies to insurgents.  Agents of foreign nations also have no 
political grievances inside Iraq, but their goal is to secure their own nations’ interests by 
manipulating Iraq’s internal politics.  Members of this group are generally not involved in 
insurgent operations, but support the insurgents with supplies and funding.  This group is 
completely averse to rapprochement and has no role in a new Iraqi government, although 
foreign nations may find that a stable Iraqi government serves their interests. 
 
3. Group III – Indigenous Islamists 
Although the majority of insurgents and most of the support for the insurgency 
appear to be secular in orientation, this aspect of the conflict is largely overshadowed by 
Islamist extremists, both indigenous and transnational.  Internal to Iraq, Islamism dates to 
 
106 Ahmed Hashim, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq” (Newport, RI: US Naval War 
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the mid-1940s when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) began operating in Iraq to restore 
traditional Islamic values to society, spread the religion’s message, and relate this 
message to contemporary issues.  During the 1950s, the MB denounced all forms of 
westernization, secularism, nationalism and Marxism, the ruling elite, and its parties and 
supporters.  The Brotherhood blamed all of society’s problems on the perceived deviation 
from Islam, and these ideas resonated with a segment of Iraq’s population.108
Although Hussein’s Ba’athist ideology nearly eliminated Islamism from the 
country, strains from the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT STORM and the sanctions 
beginning in 1991 forced Saddam to loosen the restrictions on Iraq’s mosques.  At this 
point, many young Iraqi men thought that the Ba’ath Party had lost its ideological 
coherence and eschewed the Party’s original ideas in search of an alternate belief system.  
Since the strains had partially removed Saddam’s ability to maintain his grip on the 
mosques, mosques “were the only institution, apart from the tribes, relatively immune to 
regime and party control.  They became the natural place for people in search of an 
alternative to the Ba’th to pass their free time.”109  To a large degree, this resulted from 
Saddam’s destruction of Iraq’s civil society.  With no viable social networks besides the 
Party, Iraqis had few options for alternative expression and the mosque welcomed them 
into the Islamic social network.  As Ayyash al-Kubaysi of the Muslim Ulema Council 
explains, the mosque basically reared many of Iraq’s young men.110
During the 1990s, mosques began rebuilding the civil society that Saddam’s 
policies and the international sanctions had worked so diligently to destroy.  Some 
organizations began promoting veiling and seclusion of women as well as other Islamist 
means of controlling daily life in Iraq.  After the regime fell in 2003 and Iraq’s society 
fell into chaos, Islamist associations began cementing their control over Iraqi society.  
Some mosques quickly began vehemently objecting to the US occupation and organizing 
demonstrations after Friday prayers.  Shortly after the regime collapsed, US forces 
clashed with insurgents in the Sunni city of Fallujah.  Fallujah’s defenders represented 
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several smaller groups, including secular Ba’athist or nationalist organization, but most 
claimed Islamic attachments.  At this point, however, averting democratic rule was not 
the objective; the insurgents simply wanted power over their city.111
The most radical Islamists are the Salafis and Wahhabis who label any secular 
regime as apostate and jahiliyya, referring to the period of ignorance before God revealed 
Islam to Muhammad.  Two characteristics of this group are particularly disturbing.  First 
is the desire to ignite a full-scale sectarian conflict between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a.  It 
appears that the Salafis believe that a full-scale civil war will force the Coalition to 
withdraw its troops, leaving them to conquer the Shi’a and impose a puritanical Islamist 
caliphate.  Secondly, these extremists groups “differ from other Sunni insurgents in their 
willingness to use violence against noncombatants and the innocent and in their 
willingness to use violence against other Muslims. They are far more willing to use 
extreme methods of violence, like suicide bombs....”112  These tactics, and the collusion 
with transnational Salafi groups like al-Qaeda, have caused the Islamist extremists to 
capture worldwide media attention and dominate the information arena of the insurgency. 
Much like the indigenous secularists, the indigenous Islamists’ grievances and 
goals are relatively straightforward and easily understood.  The most radical of the 
Islamists decry apostate regimes and see democracy as an affront to God’s sovereignty, 
so they see no role for themselves in a representative form of government.  As such, their 
goal is to replace any US-installed government with a puritanical Sunni regime, and they 
are decidedly not candidates for rapprochement.  More moderate Islamists may be drawn 
into a representative government if they can be assured that this secular government will 
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4. Group IV – Transnational Islamists 
Many insurgents pointedly assert that indigenous Iraqis comprise the bulk of the 
fighting force, regardless of religion.113  Indeed, most Coalition estimates and journalists 
claim that foreign fighters, or transnationals, make up only about ten percent of Iraq’s 
insurgents.  These transnationals are responsible for a large portion of the most lethal 
attacks in Iraq, however, and they have established relative superiority over the 
information operations aspects of the conflict.  These two facts allow the transnationals to 
capture much more media attention than their numbers suggest. 
Although all Islamists believe that religion should be the defining feature of 
government, and that a puritanical Sunni-oriented regime should govern, transnational 
Islamists differ from Iraq’s indigenous Islamists in two important ways.  First, 
transnational jihadists received their ideological indoctrination outside of Iraq, so their 
beliefs do not always coincide with those of Iraq’s indigenous organizations.  On the 
whole, Iraq’s Islamists tend to hold more liberal views than transnational varieties, which 
may allow for more compromise between groups.  However, collusion between Iraq’s 
indigenous groups and the transnational Islamists has contributed to the rise of Salafism 
in postwar Iraq.114
Secondly, indigenous Iraqis tend to be more concerned with installing a pure 
Islamic regime in Iraq first, whereas transnational Islamists see Iraq as merely one point 
of departure for the creation of a regional or global caliphate.  Ayman al-Zawahiri 
confirms this goal in a 2004 letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in which he outlines the 
stages of the Iraqi conflict.  The first stage is expelling the Americans from Iraq, followed 
by establishing an Islamic caliphate over as much Iraqi territory as possible.  In the third 
stage, Zawahiri counsels Zarqawi to “extend the jihad wave to the secular countries 
neighboring Iraq,” because 
 
113  For an example, consider the following statement by Sheikh Zafer Al-'Ubeidi, given to a 
television reporter during a battle in Fallujah: "Just as the enemy recruited 35 of the world's countries to 
occupy Iraq, we have the right and the honor [to recruit] Arab fighters. We are connected by the destiny of 
our Arab identity and Islam. But the [Arab volunteers] do not have a leading role. They had the honor of 
participating, but most of the fighting was carried out by Iraqis, and of Falluja in particular."   
 Quoted from MEMRI, “Iraqi & Arab Mujahideen Tell Al-Arabiya TV of the Wait List for 
Martyrdom Operations and Other Methods of ‘Destroying the Americans.’” 
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the mujahedeen must not have their mission end with the expulsion of the 
Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their weapons, and silence the 
fighting zeal. We will return to having the secularists and traitors holding 
sway over us. Instead, their ongoing mission is to establish an Islamic 
state, and defend it, and for every generation to hand over the banner to 
the one after it until the Hour of Resurrection.115
One very important distinguishing factor between the Islamists and secularists lies 
in the type of goals espoused by these groups.  Whereas secularists tend to promote 
“negative goals” of preventing the Iraqi government from asserting its power, and have 
not espoused a cohesive ideology or structure for their own governing vision, the 
Islamists do have a “positive goal” of an ideal government they are prepared to 
implement.  In this regard, they are the group that appears to be most successful at 
performing the four functions outlined by Charles Tilly: eliminating or neutralizing 
external rivals (war-making), eliminating or neutralizing internal rivals (state-making), 
protection (eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients, often providing both 
the threat and the protection), and extraction (acquiring the means to carry out the first 
three objectives).116  If the Islamists can perform these functions, they are likely to be 
seen by Iraq’s population as legitimate rulers, much like many Afghanis supported the 
Taliban even if they disagreed with the governing principles. 
According to Fawaz Gerges, evidence shows that al-Qaeda has established an 
operational base in Iraq under the name Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, 
composed of a coalition of militants from Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah and al-Tawhid wa al-
Jihad.  These groups appear to maintain separate paramilitary units but coordinate joint 
operations.  This group, until recently led by hard-line Salafist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
has taken credit for some of the deadliest attacks against Iraqi collaborators, as well as 
international attacks in neighboring countries.117
Cementing the relationship that secured al-Qaeda’s operational base in Iraq in late 
2004, Zarqawi proved himself and his group as lethal combatants in the jihad.  Although 
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he entered Iraq before the invasion with only a few dozen fighters, he built an operational 
base that proved capable and durable despite several US attacks on his organization.118  
Gerges also points out that American and Iraqi estimates claim that Zarqawi’s 
organization employs about 1,000 Arab fighters, but his Jordanian biographer, who 
presumably has better access to Zarqawi’s organization, places the number at 5,000 full-
time fighters supported by a network of 20,000 loyal followers.119
On June 7, 2006, however, two American F-16s destroyed Zarqawi’s safehouse 
near Baquba in an air raid, and Zarqawi died from his wounds shortly after the attack.120  
Analysts are still debating the impact that Zarqawi’s death will have for the Coalition 
effort in the Iraqi insurgency.  Cordesman claims that regardless of government actions in 
the coming weeks, Zarqawi’s death will have a positive impact because Zarqawi is the 
only figure in the Iraqi insurgency that has captured the world’s attention.  Indeed, 
Islamist organizations inside Iraq and around the region immediately began 
congratulating his organization for Zarqawi’s martyrdom.  What remains to be seen, 
however, is whether or not the Coalition can eliminate Al-Qaeda’s operations in Iraq with 
the loss of its leader.  Perhaps without Zarqawi’s leadership, what remains of his 
organization will moderate and assume a more Iraqi character.  Regardless, Cordesman 
posits, “One thing is clear, most of the insurgency will not be affecting [sic] because Al 
Qa’ida is a highly visible and extraordinarily brutal cadre within a much larger group of 
different insurgent movements.”121
To summarize the transnational Islamists, their grievance remains apostate 
regimes governing Muslims, and their goal is a regional or global caliphate under 
puritanical Sunni rule.  These groups despise any attempt at negotiation with the 
Coalition or the new Iraqi government, and even kill Iraqi citizens who collaborate with 
these forces.  As such, transnational Islamists in Iraq are not candidate for 
rapprochement. 
 
118 Gerges, 250-53. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the literature exploring mobilizing structures in Iraq’s Sunni 
insurgency is varied and complex, but only agrees on a few general issues.  Gathering 
sufficient demographic data to accurately categorize insurgent groups continues to be a 
challenge, and the disagreement over the proper level of aggregation illustrates this.  
Even so, Iraq’s Sunni insurgent groups can be described as indigenous secularists, 
transnational secularists, indigenous Islamists or transnational Islamists.  Every major 
Sunni insurgent group in Iraq fits into one of these categories, and organizing them in this 
fashion will allow an effective counterstrategy to be more easily created.  For example, 
under this framework most secular and many moderate Islamist organizations are 
candidates for rapprochement, while most criminal and ultraradical Islamist organizations 
have no interest in cooperating with the new Iraqi government.  The following chart 
concisely summarizes the current status of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. 
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Table 2.   Expanded Categorization of Sunni Insurgents 
 
Furthermore, the major mobilizing structures available to Sunnis during the initial 
effort to address their grievances included groups with no experience in representative or 
non-violent conflict resolution.  While many of Iraq’s mosques are no doubt peaceful, 
Islamic extremists offered funding and resources for Iraqis who would support their 
views, and Saddam’s former security forces institutionalized violence for conflict 
58 
resolution and political manipulation.  The fact that these particular violence-prone 
structures were in place to address Sunni grievances as they arose increased the chances 




                                                
V. FRAMING IN THE SUNNI IRAQI INSURGENCY
Collective identity, grievances and mobilizing structures are necessary conditions 
for a sustained social movement, but these conditions are still not sufficient to explain 
why and how these identities are able to mobilize a population for collective action.  
Collective identities exist to some degree in every society, but not every society 
experiences violent social movements like the Iraqi insurgency.  Likewise, identity 
groups in many societies experience severe grievances, such as political exclusion and 
indiscriminate repression, but these grievances do not evolve into social movements to 
resolve them.  What accounts for this? 
The concept of frames and framing offers one explanation.  In this chapter, I show 
how framing applies to the Sunni insurgency in Iraq.  I then identify three general frames 
that resonate with the historical foundation of Sunni identity in Iraq – foreign occupation, 
army as arbiter of politics, and worldly power as a symbol of God’s favor – and 
categorize recent public statements by Sunni insurgents into these three framesets. 
 
A. FRAMING THEORY 
A frame is “an interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out 
there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, 
and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.”122  Social movement 
theorists use frames to capture a multitude of social processes, but a frame’s basic 
function is to provide a lens through which to interpret life.123  These frames can be 
created, manipulated and contested to serve the needs of a social movement.  When used 
to influence an identity group, however, the frame must be closely aligned with existing 
beliefs of the group; it must resonate with the group’s collective identity.  Without this 
resonance, the frame will not be effective.  Coupled with grievances, an effective framing 
strategy offers one portion of the sufficient explanation for why some identity groups 
choose to mobilize for collective action. 
 
122 David Snow and Robert Benford.  Quoted in Goodwin, et al., 6. 
123 Ibid. 
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Quintan Wiktorowicz also offers four framing strategies that Iraqi leaders have 
used throughout history: exaltation, vilification, credentialing and decredentialing.  
Exaltation occurs when leaders attempt to convince the frame’s targets of the inherent 
superiority of the movement’s particular ideals, goals, principles or similar concepts.  
Leaders use vilification to demonize the opponent’s ideals, goals and principles.  For 
example, Islamic fundamentalists frequently exalt the social order of the Rashidun while 
vilifying the secularism of western globalization.  Credentialing is used to persuade the 
targets that the movement and its leaders are worthy of their participation and following, 
and that only their leaders possess the ability to resolve the grievances.  Decredentialing 
is the opposite; it aims to remove the perception that the opposition’s leaders deserve the 
targets’ support.124  Using the example of Islamic fundamentalists again, other 
fundamentalists are generally credentialed as worthy of leading society, while secular 
westerners or non-Muslims are portrayed (or framed) as inferior and unable to govern a 
moral society.  Each of these framing strategies can be seen throughout Iraq’s history and 
in the current insurgency. 
More appropriately, David Snow and Robert Benford describe three types of 
frames necessary for recruitment into social movements.  First, diagnostic frames attempt 
to convince a target that a social problem exists and that it must be addressed.  Next, 
prognostic frames recommend strategies, tactics and targets that will address the 
grievances.  Last, motivational frames encourage the targets that they should become 
involved with the movement in order to resolve the problem.125  This framework has 
more explanatory power in determining how a movement coalesces from a simple 
grievance into motivating a population to violent collective action.  Each of these frame 
types is present in the Iraqi insurgency today. 
 
124 Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Framing Jihad: Intra-Movement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda's Struggle 
for Sacred Authority," International Review of Social History 49 supp. 12 (December 2004): 159.
125 Goodwin, et al., 6. 
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B. FRAME #1: FOREIGN OCCUPATION 
The insurgency in Iraq has many facets and many disparate goals, even within the 
Sunni identity group.  No clear political platform has been expressed by the insurgents as 
to what Iraq would look like under their rule.  As Steven Metz and Raymond Millen 
explain, however, the insurgent groups share one theme in common: the “primary 
foundation of the ideology of the Iraqi insurgency is opposition to foreign rule.”126  The 
available literature on framing in the Iraqi insurgency reaches a broad consensus that 
most messages fall under this frame.  Although the specifics of each author’s categories 
differ, they all have a common thread of opposition to foreign occupation.  Timothy 
Haugh’s three categories are subsets of this frame, for example.  Baram describes 
messages appealing to Iraqi patriotism and pan-Arabism, encouraging the opposition to 
cooperate to overthrow the Coalition, and while Cordesman categorizes based on 
religious or secular justification, but admits that a majority of the messages call for 
resistance to and expulsion of the Coalition and its goals. 
Similar to Cordesman’s categories, Metz and Millen explain that nationalism 
plays a role in this resistance, but rule over Muslims by non-Muslims is also seen as a 
direct confrontation with the Qur’an.  This opposition and the accompanying anti-
Americanism are the only framework present in the insurgency.  Therefore, Islamists use 
this frame to provide religious grounds for resisting the occupation, such as aversion to 
rule by infidels or the impiety of democracy, while secularists provide imperialist 
arguments or point out the failings of the occupiers to provide basic government services.  
Both groups’ actions support these frames, and at this point, they simply want to show 
the Iraqi people that US occupation forces cannot govern.127  Although most identity 
groups would object to foreign rule, this objection alone will not evolve into a cohesive 
independence movement without an effective framing strategy to convince participants 
that high-risk violent action is necessary and promises the possibility of success.  In this 
instance, the insurgents have provided a diagnostic frame that foreign occupation is Iraq’s 
 
126 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan: Change and Continuity,” 
(Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army War College, 2003), 10. 
127 Ibid. 
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most significant problem, and the prognostic frame posits that violently targeting the 
Coalition will result in an end to the occupation. 
Encouraging the broad-based anti-Coalition frame in Iraq performs some valuable 
functions for the insurgents.  While not all-encompassing, pan-Arabism and Iraqi 
patriotism are two deep-seated emotions within the country, and pan-Arabism extends 
beyond Iraq’s borders.  Framing the struggle in such terms “provides a respectable 
ideological legitimacy to the effort to return the Ba'thi regime to power or to return the 
Sunni Arab community to a position of supremacy through other means.”128  Thus, the 
secular insurgents have found an appealing emotion that supports their prognostic frame 
of returning them to governmental power.  Encouraging pan-Arabism also “holds a 
promise of financial, political, and military support from the Sunni Arab world, 
especially from the Gulf States, who object to any growing Shi'i influence.”129
Even though broad consensus exists on this frameset, the messages released 
sometimes bring to light fissures within the insurgent ranks.  In this case a framing 
contest occurs in which two groups attempt to convince the target audience of their 
vision’s superiority.  As one notable example, Usama Bin Laden does not encourage 
conflict between the Shi’a and Sunni population since this drains energy and resources 
from the fight against the Americans.  Although his Salafist views hold that Shi’a are not 
truly Muslims, he calls for the population to set aside any sectarian, ethnic or ideological 
differences until the Americans have been defeated: 
The Iraqi who is waging jihad against the infidel Americans or Allawi’s 
[former prime minister Ayad Allawi] renegade government is our brother 
and companion, even if he was of Persian, Kurdish, or Turkomen origin.  
The Iraqi who joins this renegade government to fight against the 
mujahedeen who resist occupation, is considered a renegade and one of 





128 Baram, Who Are The Insurgents? 
129 Ibid. 
130 Gerges, 257. 
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This conflict also played out within al-Qaeda’s own organization.  Ayman Zawahiri, al-
Qaeda’s ideological leader, sent a letter to Zarqawi, the commander of Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq131, praising his efforts at jihad but chastising him for driving a wedge between Iraq’s 
Sunni and Shi’a communities.132
In this way, leaders of much of the Iraqi insurgency illustrate that throwing off the 
bonds of occupation is more important at the moment than religious differences, akin to 
the Maoist mantra that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”  This enhances the 
prognostic frame that only Muslim cooperation will accomplish this mission, and also 
provides a motivational frame because Zawahiri is extending a temporary olive branch to 
Iraq’s other identity groups.  Inclusion into the struggle is a strong motivator, especially 
for minorities worried about their future in a new governing system. 
As previously stated, an effective frame must resonate with its target’s collective 
identity.  Resistance to foreign occupation became a theme in the Iraqi identity almost 
immediately after WWI, when the Ottoman’s decentralized system of governance was 
replaced by the British attempt to enforce centralized governing institutions.  Shortly 
after the British administration began, Iraqi tribes of the Euphrates initiated an uprising in 
1920 that lasted several months and cost as many as 10,000 Iraqi lives, 450 British 
soldiers and ₤40 million.  William Cleveland posits that “even though the rebellion was 
not a self-consciously nationalist movement, it was inspired by anti-British sentiments 
and became enshrined in Iraqi national mythology as the first symbol of the new state’s 
rejection of foreign rule.”133
This national mythology provides a strong foundation for the frames used by 
Iraq’s Sunni insurgents today.  For example, Sunni opposition (both violent and non-





131 Al-Qaeda in Iraq appears to adopt several other names as well, such as Al-Qaeda in the Land of 
Two Rivers, Al-Qaeda Jihad Organization in Mesopotamia, etc. 
132 “English Translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri's letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.” 
133 Cleveland, 205. 
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domination and illegitimacy in the Arab world, which taints any Coalition project in Iraq 
regardless of its potential to improve the country.134  Consider the following statement 
from the Islamic Army in Iraq: 
When the infidel Americans and their allies became weak and the burden 
became unbearable, they decided to rescue their remaining dignity by 
using so-called democracy in order to rule over us using our own people. 
It is well-known that the meaning of democracy is ‘rule of the people’, but 
their decisions are not true to this infidel concept. Moreover, they impose 
whatever they like in the name of democracy, this democracy that gives 
cover to occupation and tyranny.135
This statement clearly portrays an attempt to frame the U.S. as unfit to govern Iraq, as 
untrustworthy, and as tyrannical colonists.  However, it also provides insight into the 
struggle between Sunni and Shi’a identity groups in Iraq. 
Identity groups play very salient roles in how the new government will operate.  
When the Hussein regime fell, Sunni status plummeted relative to the marked increase of 
the Shi’a groups.  At the time of the Islamic Army of Iraq’s statement, the governing 
structures put into place by the Coalition clearly institutionalized this change,136 and a 
framing contest ensued between the Sunnis and Shi’a over the legitimacy of the new Iraqi 
government.  Sunni groups “warned that the elections were ‘farcical and un-Islamic’ and 
threatened to punish those who participated.  On the other hand, the leading Shia cleric, 
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued an edict that called voting a ‘religious duty similar 




134 Bellin, 603. 
135 Global Terror Alert, “The Islamic Army in Iraq on the Upcoming Elections,” 13 January 2005, 
http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0105/islamicarmy0105-2.pdf (accessed 6 October 2006). 
136 The recent elections ushered in a government viewed as legitimate by nearly all Shi’a and Kurds, 
but free and fair elections were nearly impossible to guarantee inside the Sunni triangle.  Therefore, most 
Sunni Arabs do not grant legitimacy to the new government.  For more on this, see Baram, Who Are the 
Insurgents? 
137 Andrzej Kapiszewski, “The Iraqi Elections and Their Consequences: Power-sharing, a Key to the 
Country’s Political Future,” in Looking Into Iraq, ed. Walter Posch (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 
July 2005), http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai79.pdf#search=%22posch%20%22looking%20into%20Iraq%22%22 (accessed 6 
October 2006), 15. 
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C. FRAME #2: ARMY AS ARBITER OF POLITICS 
Aside from the military conquests that have installed rule by force in most of the 
world’s nations at some point in their histories, Sunni army units have been the final 
arbiter in Iraq’s politics since the beginning of the country’s independence.  In order to 
understand this, it is important to first examine the historical role that Iraq’s military 
played for the Sunnis.  During the Ottoman Tanzimat, the government commissioned the 
6th Army Corps in Iraq.  This elevated Baghdad’s status in the empire from an 
unimportant posting on the fringes to an integral position in the bureaucratic 
administration.  More importantly for Iraqi identity, it also brought educational reforms 
that allowed Iraqis to join the Ottoman army, travel to Istanbul for education, and return 
to Iraq for duty.  These military and civil service positions offered Iraqis prestige, a 
regular income and opportunity for advancement in the Ottoman government.138  
Socially, the military became an avenue of social mobility for poor Sunni families.  An 
education from Istanbul became a highly desirable asset in Iraqi society and many future 
civil and military leaders started their careers there.139  This illustrates that although 
Iraqis already carried identities with loyalties to Sunnism, tribe, family and region, they 
also began to participate in a new collective identity based on Ottoman values. 
The sultan attempted to craft this officer corps into a political force loyal to him 
personally, but the Iraqis resisted this effort.  As with other constructed identities, the 
officer corps’ unity of membership rested on shared experiences and professionalism, but 
this particular identity’s loyalty lied with its other members rather than with the political 
force that provided these experiences and instilled the professionalism.  This would have 
a tremendous impact upon Iraqi society in the coming years, and “the creation of the new 
Ottoman officer corps as a distinct entity superseding political loyalties would outlast the 
empire itself, disintegrating as a whole but regrouping its members in the new states 
(especially Iraq) created after the war.”140  To further enhance the Sunni identity in 
contrast with the Shi’a, the Ottomans maintained a policy of recruiting coreligionists into 
 
138 Walid Khadduri, “Social Background of Modern Iraqi Politics” (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins 
University, 1970), 38-42.  Cited in Reeva S. Simon, “The Education of an Iraqi Ottoman Army Officer,” in 
The Origins of Arab Nationalism, ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih and Reeva S. 
Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 151-52. 
139 Simon, 151. 
140 Ibid., 156. 
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positions of power, so Sunni Arabs (and to a lesser extent, Sunni Kurds) dominated the 
officer corps.  This also highlights the Shi’a clergy’s desire to minimize contact with the 
Ottoman administration, and the Sunni denial of Shi’a patriotism demonstrated in two 
major conflicts against the British.141
Over time, the Ottomans began shifting the locus of identity away from Islam and 
inclusive “Ottoman-ism” towards their Turkish identity, in effect ostracizing the Arabs 
and politicizing the Iraqi army.  As Iraqi officers began to join secret societies and read 
the works of liberal Ottomans calling for equality of all under Ottoman rule, they 
demonstrated a greater loyalty to their professional and local identities than to the 
Ottoman identity.  Once the British separated Iraq from the Ottomans, however, the Iraqi 
military retained the professional identity and the accompanying social networks and 
politicization that would play an important political role after the British mandate was 
instituted.142   
This professional identity had two significant impacts on the Sunni army officers. 
First, the initial Iraqi monarch installed by the British (King Faysal from the Arabian 
peninsula) filled out his civilian and military staffs with Sunni officers who had returned 
to Iraq from Ottoman posts.  The direct transfer of this existing identity network into the 
Iraqi political system consolidated the Sunni officers’ power.  By the end of the decade, 
these officers had become the political elite in Iraq.143  Secondly, the army became the 
arbiter of politics in Iraq.  King Faysal maintained Iraq’s government with excellent 
mediating skills, but after his death in 1933, Iraq’s politics degenerated into a power 
struggle among the political elite.  This infighting, coupled with the tight circle of 
political power, disaffected many segments of Iraq’s population.144  Young military 
officers comprised the most prominent members of the opposition.  These Sunni officers 
regarded themselves and their army units as true symbols of the new Iraqi nation, and 
they were eager to assert their influence in Iraq and abroad.  In 1936, the army stepped in 
to resolve the issues with a coup staged by General Bakr Sidqi; this brought the army 
 
141 Davis, 57. 
142 Ibid., 157-161. 
143 Ibid., 162. 
144 Cleveland, 209-11. 
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firmly into Iraqi politics.  Six more coups between 1936 and 1941, after which the army 
converted to civilian leaders rather than keeping control for themselves, cemented the 
military’s position as the final power broker in the Iraqi political system.145
This key aspect of Sunni officer identity, army as arbiter of politics, is played out 
in framing contests today.  With the fall of the Hussein regime, many Ba’athists and 
regime loyalists lost prestige and status, and believed that their nation similarly suffered a 
decline in status.  These groups are mainly secular, although they cooperate with the 
Islamic radicals when interests coincide.  Playing on the historical identity of Sunni army 
units embodying the country’s image, they used a credentialing frame to portray the 
insurgency as an attempt to fulfill their role as rightful arbiters of politics by defending 
the country from unjust rule.146  Furthermore, after Hussein’s fall the Coalition simply 
released the military with no attempt to maintain unit cohesion or accountability.  This 
oversight offered a tremendous boon in mobilizing structures and resources, as many of 
these groups and often their associated arms and equipment translated directly into 
insurgent organizations. 
In today’s insurgency, the connection between this frame and historical identity is 
less defined than others because Saddam’s army and security forces have been disbanded.  
However, the spirit of the national army is present in many of the insurgent groups, both 
Islamist and secular, as they submit that they hold the key to the nation’s honor and will 
rightly resist the occupation using violent means.  For example, al-Qaeda in Iraq released 
a video on April 25, 2006, showing Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi with masked fighters, firing 
an automatic weapon, and showing mujahedin firing newly acquired missiles.  This video 
spoke of Iraq’s honor, framing the struggle as an occupation that can only be resolved 
through the use of military tactics.  In many videos and statements such as this, Zarqawi 
and others attempt to reinforce their positions as military protectors who will restore 
Iraq’s honor.147
 
145 Cleveland, 209-11. 
146 In this case, unjust rule coincided with the decredentialing frames against the foreign occupiers 
and the new Shi’a-dominated government.   
147 MEMRI, “New Video by Al-Qaeda Commander in Iraq Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi” Special 
Dispatch Series, no. 1149 (26 April 2006), 
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iraq&ID=SP114906 (accessed 6 October 2006).  
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More pointedly and in line with Iraq’s recent history, Saddam’s security services 
used personal violence against the population as a tool for political manipulation, and 
many of the insurgency’s messages fall into this category.  Therefore, although the 
previous security organizations do not exist, the insurgent groups have adopted the role 
and tactics that coincide with those of the predecessor organizations.  Most anti-
collaboration messages fit into this category; the insurgents convey the message that 
democracy will not save the country, but their violent struggle will, and they threaten 
death for simply cooperating with the new government.  For example, Bin Laden 
circulated two letters in Iraq that “condemned and sentenced to death as an apostate any 
Iraqi Muslim who collaborated with the US occupation or sought to establish 
democracy....”148
This reinforces the notion that institutionalized violence against an individual is 
an appropriate means to influence society, just as the army has done throughout Iraq’s 
history; these organizations are vying to be the final arbiters of Iraq’s politics by using 
military means.  A simple but obvious example is the restrictions against participating in 
the elections that took place in the Sunni triangle.  Not only did the insurgents threaten to 
kill collaborators, but they also posted signs warning Muslims that the “elections are a 
legitimate target for Jihad fighters operations [sic]” and to stay away from polling centers 
“for your own well-being.”149
 
D. FRAME #3: WORLDLY POWER DEMONSTRATES GOD’S FAVOR 
Part of the Sunni identity is based upon geography and the struggle for supremacy 
between the Shi’a Safavids and the Sunni Ottomans.  Just as Max Weber described 
Protestants’ view of worldly success as demonstrating God’s favor,150 the Ottoman 
victory was seen by many as symbolizing God’s approval of Sunnism by granting them  
 
 
148 Kepel, 238. 
149 MEMRI, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq: The Drafters of the Iraqi Constitution and Those Who Support Them 
Are Infidels Who Must Be Killed” Special Dispatch Series, no. 962 (19 August 2005) 
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iraq&ID=SP96205 (accessed 6 October 2006). 
150 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Virginia: University of Virginia 
American Studies Program hypertext, 2001), 7. 
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worldly power over neighboring Shi’a.  This tradition continued throughout the Ottoman 
era and until the Coalition overthrew Hussein in 2003, and some Sunnis equate Sunni 
rule with worldly power. 
Mark Juergensmeyer provides a foundation for understanding this aspect of the 
conflict by defining “cosmic war” as the “metaphysical conflicts between good and evil” 
that “transcend human experience.”151  A struggle framed as cosmic war “enlivens the 
religious imagination and compels violent action.”152  Cosmic war is more symbolic than 
pragmatic, finds moral justification for violence in a religious imperative, and “operates 
on a divine time line with victory being imminent but not in this lifetime.”153  In 
Juergensmeyer’s view, “Islamist...networks have placed their struggle against secularism, 
perceived Western domination, and the United States, in a cosmic context.”154  In other 
words, the struggle between U.S. occupation in Iraq and a return to Sunni rule takes place 
on a metaphysical battlefield between Good and Evil as much as it does on the streets of 
Baghdad.155  If Sunnis lose power in Baghdad, they are suffering God’s disfavor and 
must work to regain it.  This frame resonates most strongly with Muslims whose faith 
forms a central aspect of their identity than with secularists, but this does not mean it 
resonates only with fundamentalists.  However, it provides a very clear example of 
exaltation and vilification by pitting their cause (Good) against the U.S. objectives (Evil).  
Extending this logic, their leaders are credentialed because they represent the good and 
holy, while the U.S. represents the evil and secular.  More importantly, it serves a 
prognostic function, prescribing resistance to occupation as the path to restoring God’s 
favor, and a motivational function as all good Muslims should work towards God’s 
approval. 
 
151 Juergensmeyer, 149. 
152 Gregory F. Treverton, Heather S. Gregg, Daniel Gibran and Charles W. Yost, Exploring Religious 
Conflict (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005), http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF211/ 
(accessed 7 March 2006), xi. 
153 Treverton, et al., xii. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Of note, the frames utilized by both sides in a framing contest necessarily influence each other.  
The Coalition’s frames often adopt the same metaphysical tone of “freedom vs tyranny” and “us versus 
them” displayed by the insurgents. 
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As with other examples, this cosmic frame must resonate with the basic identity, 
and Iraq has a history of using religion to address grievances.  This trend was greatly 
amplified when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) began to crystallize its ideas for Iraq in 
1945.  True to the Muslim Brothers’ philosophy, struggles were placed in the “cosmic 
war” frame of good versus evil.  The MB’s major purpose was to restore traditional 
Islamic values to society, spread the religion’s message, and relate this message to 
contemporary issues.  During the 1950s, the MB’s activities were characterized by an 
uncompromising denunciation of westernization, secularism, nationalism and Marxism, 
the ruling elite, its parties and supporters, and attributing society’s problems to the 
perceived deviation from Islam by these ideologies and groups.  Moreover, “the Muslim 
Brothers did not consider themselves as a political party but a genuine and new trend.  
They saw their mission as bigger than that of a political party and their role equally 
involving political, social and intellectual endeavors.”156  This exemplifies an attempt to 
use religion and God’s favor in credentialing and decredentialing frames. 
Furthermore, the MB utilized the diagnostic, prognostic and mobilizing frames 
outlined by Snow and Benford.  As Basim al-Azami explains, 
“[t]he Muslim Brothers opted for a political Islamic party on the grounds 
that political action was both a religious and national duty, that the nature 
of Islam demanded organized action, that leaving ‘un-Islamic’ parties 
unchallenged in the political arena was a fatal mistake, and that Islam as a 
faith required propagation and promotion through organized action.157
This type of framing resonated with a segment of Iraq’s population, and these views have 
gained popularity in the last decade.  The Ba’ath party’s objective of creating a one-party 
state nearly destroyed Iraq’s civil society, affecting the MB and communists alike, until 
sanctions in 1991, when Hussein was forced to loosen the restrictions on the mosque. The 
sanctions affected his ability to provide some basic government services, and he utilized 
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157 Ibid., 168. 
71 
                                                
tribes and Islamists to substitute.  As more Muslims were free to examine these 
issues, the frame once again began to resonate.158
In today’s insurgency, this frame that worldly power demonstrates God’s favor is 
most commonly used by Islamists.  The most radical Islamists are the Salafis, and many 
subscribe to Sayyid Qutb’s framing of apostate regimes as jahiliyya, referring to the 
period of ignorance before God revealed Islam to Muhammad.  This diagnostic frame 
posits that the problems with society arise from secular rule.  In Qutb’s tradition, 
society’s members have a duty to remove such regimes from power, violently if 
necessary, and end the jahiliyya.  Qutb’s prognostic frame claims that the imposition of a 
pious regime and Sharia law will bring the population closer to Allah’s will.  In general, 
these frames take the form of credentialing and exalting Muslim fighters, claiming that 
God will show favor upon the Muslims by granting them worldly power.  Likewise, they 
decredential and vilify the infidel Crusaders for their heathen customs, asserting that God 
will not allow them victory over Muslim lands as long as the mujahedin remain pure. 
This frame’s purpose is to make the practical calculations of power appear to be 
religiously justified.  In any representative government, the Sunnis are likely to cede a 
large measure of power to the Shi’a and Kurds, and this will weaken the transnational 
Sunni power base.  Therefore, insurgents must justify their positions ideologically, and 
the transnationals in particular must justify their existence and actions in Iraq.  The 
following statements provide examples of messages in this frame, with the framing types 
added in italics following each section. 
1.  Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s “Department of Indoctrination” released a magazine 
titled “The Crest of the Summit of Islam” (commonly used to designate 
jihad), which contained an article discussing the organization and its aims 
in Iraq. 
 
Why do we carry out operations in Iraq against the Americans and their 
collaborators in the military and the police?  The goal is:  
 
158 For more information on the effects of repression on framing, see Asef Bayat, “Islamism and 
Social Movement Theory,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 6 (2005): 891-908.  He claims that an “effective 
framing strategy would require, first, a political opportunity to allow effective communication and, second, 
the means to carry out such communication” (903).  The MB’s message likely suffered under Hussein 
because “[r]estricted political opportunity and lack of resources are likely to limit the effectiveness of 
consensus mobilization” (903). 
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1) In order to please Allah, who commanded [to fight the] Jihad and to 
repel those who attack lives and [women's] honor and property and to 
expel them from Iraq - the land of the Caliphs.  [Credentialing] 
2) In order to redeem the honor of our brothers and the chastity of our 
sisters and the innocence of our Muslim children, [all of whom] have 
been ravaged by the Americans and their Shi'ite collaborators in the 
brigades of treachery [a reference to the Shi'ite Badr Brigades, which 
is the military wing of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic 
Revolution of Iraq] and the party of Satan's mission [a reference to Al-
Ja'fari's Hizb Al-Da'wa party].  [Vilification] 
3) In order to make the light of the Caliphate shine once again from 
Baghdad, the capital of the Caliphate, so that it will spread the light of 
justice and prosperity around the world, as things used to be in the 
time of Harun Al-Rashid.  [Credentialing, Prognostic] 
4) In order to kill those whose character has become impure and who has 
joined the ranks of the infidels in their fight against the Muslims in 
Iraq, that is, members of the Iraqi army and the police and spies, who 
strengthen the Americans and help them to commit crimes and to rape 
our sisters in the Abu Ghraib prison and other places...159  
[Decredentialing, Vilification] 
 
2.  The Shari'a Court of Al-Qaeda in Iraq will act in accordance with Allah's 
decree, and will kill anyone who appoints himself partner to Allah and 
drafts a constitution of falsehood by whose laws people will act in matters 
of livelihood, life and death, honor, and domestic and foreign policy.  
[Decredentialing] 
 
 Allah said: ‘Fight them until there is no more fitna [civil strife] and the 
religion is only Allah's; but if they desist, then surely Allah sees what they 
do’ [Koran 8:39]…  The goal of our struggle is to eradicate the [danger] 
of fitna that lies in the heretical modern constitution.  We will fight it by 
argument and by communiqués, and also by sword and spear – because 
the constitution is a false religion and its drafters and those who promote 
it are apostates [murtaddoon]…160  [Prognostic, Credentialing] 
 
3.  On August 3, 2005, Islamist message forums posted an audio recording 
titled "The Constitution – Religion of Infidels," by Sheikh Abu Hamza Al-
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 There is no doubt that one of the important things for which America 
came [to Iraq] is to establish the principles of appealing to a law besides 
the law of Allah.  It has turned the tyrannical [Arab] rulers into a tool in 
its hands so that they can implement the principles of its constitution upon 
the land of Islam…  [Decredentialing] 
 
 The drafting of the constitution is a very grave act, which contradicts 
monotheism and is against the religion of Allah.  He who drafts the 
constitution is making himself equal to the Lord of Heaven and Earth.  A 
mortal cannot make laws for the living side by side with Allah, because 
lawmaking is one of the [exclusive] attributes of the Lord, and only 
tyrants and rebels compete in this with Allah…  The crime of whoever 
makes himself a lawmaker alongside Allah is no less than the crime of 
Pharaoh and Nimrod...  [Vilification] 
 
 Islam is the Shari'a of Allah, and we are waging Jihad for the sake of 
preserving it and implementing it....161  [Credentialing] 
 
One additional aspect of this frame is the inclusion of Iraq into a larger struggle 
for Muslim supremacy.  This theme permeates al-Qaeda’s releases, with Bin Laden 
characterizing Iraq as a key battleground in a “‘third World War,’ which the ‘Crusader-
Zionist’ coalition started against the ummah” and citing Iraq as a “‘golden and unique 
opportunity’ for the global jihadists movement to engage and defeat the United States and 
spread the conflict into neighboring Arab states, including Syria, Lebanon, and the 
Palestine-Israeli theater.”162  Zawahiri extends this mission into Iraq in his letter to 
Zarqawi: 
...the mujahedeen must not have their mission end with the expulsion of 
the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their weapons, and silence the 
fighting zeal. We will return to having the secularists and traitors holding 
sway over us. Instead, their ongoing mission is to establish an Islamic 
state, and defend it, and for every generation to hand over the banner to 




161 MEMRI, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq: The Drafters of the Iraqi Constitution and Those Who Support Them 
Are Infidels Who Must Be Killed.” 
162 Gerges, 251. 
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Zarqawi continues this frame from inside Iraq with his statements, including the April 25 
video: 
When the Crusader enemy entered Iraq, it intended to gain control over 
the [Islamic] nation, and to strengthen the state of the sons of Zion, from 
the Nile to the Euphrates. But Allah has given the mujahideen sons [of the 
nation] the strength to face the cruelest Crusader campaign, invading the 
lands of the Muslims. They have withstood this invasion for more than 
three years... 
My dear nation, we in Iraq are but a stone's throw away from the place of 
the Prophet's ascension. We are fighting in Iraq, but our eyes are set upon 
Jerusalem, which will only be restored to us through the guidance of the 




In this chapter, I applied the social movement theory concept of framing to aid in 
understanding the motivations for Sunnis to mobilize to violent collective action.  The 
three major frames used by insurgent groups – foreign occupation, army as arbiter, and 
worldly power – reflect the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames outlined by 
Snow and Benford, along with the exaltation, vilification, credentialing and 
decredentialing frames defined by Wiktorowicz.  These frames resonate with the 
population only because they tap into the collective Sunni identity, constructed through 
the religious split with the Shi’a, the impact of geography, governing practices and shared 
historical memory created by the Sunni regimes. 
Recognizing these lessons may provide policy-makers with new intervention 
points to bring an end to the violence in Iraq.  Even with the attempt to create a 
monolithic Iraqi identity, Sunni or otherwise, competing collective identities have a 
history of prompting governmental changes.  This process may provide some insight into 
understanding today’s struggle for primacy.  As I explained, the future of the insurgency 
depends not only upon addressing the political grievances of the population, but also 
upon the opposition’s ability to frame the issues in such a way that the population feels 
compelled to participate in high-risk, violent collective action.  In short, the survival of 
 
164 MEMRI, “New Video by Al-Qaeda Commander in Iraq Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi.” 
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the insurgency depends on its leaders’ ability to sell their frames to the populace.  This 
recognition of the Sunnis’ collective identity and how insurgents craft an effective 
framing strategy should inform how Coalition forces can create a competing set of frames 
that will resonate with the Sunni insurgents, and constructing these favorable frames is a 





























In this thesis, I have shown that the mere existence of distinct identity groups in 
the same region is not sufficient cause for violence.  Political grievances, such as the loss 
of status, income and representation resulting from disbanding Iraq’s military, merely 
provide a necessary condition; grievances alone do not explain sustained high-risk 
collective action.  By utilizing three of social movement theory’s basic concepts, however 
– political opportunity, mobilizing structures and framing – I have provided a sufficient 
explanation for the emergence of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. 
Decreasing political opportunity, in the form of lost status, power and income; 
lack of representation in the new governing structures; and fear of violent Shi’a reprisals 
provided the grievances to spark the insurgency.  Rampant, unanswered looting 
demonstrated the Coalition’s lack of control over the physical space necessary for violent 
confrontation.  With these conditions in place, many Sunnis turned to the existing 
mobilizing structures that could best address their grievances – militant Islam, largely 
relying on foreign networks, resources and funding, and the newly dismembered military.  
These networks possessed effective skill sets in violent political manipulation, but little 
experience in democracy and non-violent conflict resolution.  Finally, these networks 
framed their violence in terms that resonated with the population – anti-occupation, army 
as arbiter of politics, and worldly power demonstrating God’s favor.  Tapping into the 
Sunnis’ shared historical memory to use these concepts as frames, insurgent statements 
defined the problem as rule by kufr occupiers or Shi’a (prognostic frame), provided a 
solution to the problem in violent resistance (diagnostic frame), and motivated support by 
directly linking the Sunni identity group’s future to the insurgency (motivational frame).  
Taken together, decreasing political opportunity, existing mobilizing structures with 
violent repertoires, and effective anti-kufr framing provides a much more salient 
explanation for Iraq’s Sunni insurgency than arguments founded on a clash of 
civilizations or some metaphysical struggle between good and evil. 
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With this new analysis in mind, what lessons can be drawn from Iraq’s insurgency 
for future conflicts?  First and foremost, despite framing contests by a conflict’s 
stakeholders, such conflicts are rarely about religion.  As Vali Nasr explains,  
To Western eyes, Muslim politics is defined by Islamic values.  Politics 
may look for truths in religious texts, but it will always do so from within 
a context that is not purely religious.  People read, understand, and 
interpret their sources of sacred meaning in relation to the hopes and fears 
that define their daily lives.165
More specifically, “history and theology may establish the identities of rival groups; but 
the actual bones of contention are far less likely to be religious ideas than matters of 
concrete power and wealth doled out along communal lines.”166  Regardless of insurgent 
claims, for the Sunnis in Iraq these communal lines include geography, shared historical 
memory, and historical governing policies and power structures as much as any religious 
distinctions. 
In future conflicts, then, the first step to finding a peaceful solution must include a 
realistic look – beyond press statements and media hype – at the groups involved.  What 
criteria actually form the groups’ boundaries?  What provides the cohesion?  How 
broadly will the groups advocating violence be able to draw support?  In 2003, the 
Coalition assumed that only a few “pockets of dead-enders” comprised the resistance,167 
when the aggrieved group involved actually included a very large percentage of Iraq’s 
population, both Sunni and Shi’a. 
Next, a realistic look at the political opportunity landscape should define the 
stakes.  In Iraq, loss of status, power and income; lack of representation in the new 
government; and physical insecurity were very real threats to all Sunnis, regardless of 
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implemented the first two orders, many Iraqis viewed “de-Ba’thification” as “de-
Sunnification” in disguise.168  Clearly, these grievances were more inclusive than a few 
pockets of dead-enders. 
Simply falling back on clash of civilizations arguments implies that the conflict 
will occur regardless of specific grievances and alleviates the responsibility of improving 
the groups’ situations.  This is not the case; social movement theory shows that 
addressing an individual’s grievance is likely to remove the motivation to mobilize for 
high-risk action like an insurgency.  Again, Vali Nasr explains: 
[Sectarian identities] matter to society and politics, but the conflicts that 
they animate are due to the lopsided distribution of resources and power 
that have benefited one sect at the cost of another.  Over time the Shi’a-
Sunni conflict can be brought under control only if the distribution of 
power and resources reflects the demographic realities of the region.169
Therefore, in the future planners should look beyond the mere existence of identity 
groups in conflict and examine the actual grievances of the groups involved.  What 
grievances do each of the stakeholders have in common?  Which of these grievances can 
be addressed and which cannot?  What will happen if the grievances are not addressed?  
Just as the Sunni-Shi’a conflict will not be brought under control until a fair distribution 
of power and resources is reached, future conflicts will continue to erupt as long as 
grievances exist. 
Also under the heading of political opportunity, what political and physical space 
is available to each group?  In the future, the US should be very clear about the messages 
it sends regarding mobilizing space, both political and physical.  In 2003, the CPA 
increasingly convinced the Sunnis that they had very little political space to participate 
non-violently, while the looting illustrated that they not only had the physical space to 
mobilize violently, but also the physical need to mobilize to fend off Shi’a reprisals. 
After identifying the groups and grievances, planners should examine how the 
groups will mobilize to address them.  Understanding that groups will mobilize if the 
space is available, an important lesson from SMT explains that aggrieved groups first 
 
168 Nasr, 198. 
169 Ibid., 252. 
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look to networks and structures that already exist in their societies, and that the 
mobilizing structures chosen necessarily affect the tone of the resistance.  In Saddam’s 
Iraq, very few mobilizing structures existed, and even fewer had repertoires of non-
violent conflict resolution.  With this knowledge, predicting that a disbanded military 
would provide both grievance and mobilizing opportunity would not have been 
difficult.170
In future conflicts, planners attempting to prevent violence must first ensure that 
non-violent avenues are available to voice grievances, and that these avenues have a 
reasonable expectation of adequately resolving the grievances.  When such avenues are 
not feasible, the structures likely to be utilized must be identified.  Rather than offering 
wholesale an organized, trained and equipped violent mobilizing structure and expecting 
the group to refrain from mobilizing, planners should encourage non-violent structures 
when possible.  If violent mobilization has already coalesced, however, the analyst must 
determine which groups are candidates for rapprochement, divide these groups based on 
grievances, and target each group individually. 
Lastly, framing offers some valuable lessons for future conflicts.  First, insurgents 
do not automatically gain the population’s support.  Support must be earned over time, 
and large segments of populations in conflict tend to remain neutral until one side gains 
the advantage.171  During this time, insurgents must not only begin addressing grievances 
(often by providing basic government services) but must also sell their viewpoints to the 
population.  This highlights an intervention point for the Coalition to influence the 
population.  However, simply countering a particular message is not sufficient; planners 
should examine the function of the message – prognostic, diagnostic or motivational – 
and craft a counter-message that fulfills the identified function.  At times, this means 
counteracting the message; other times, it could simply redirect the logic of the message 
and co-opt the original frame.  This must be done realistically, however.  A flawed policy 
will remain a flawed policy no matter how press reports spin it, so the planners must 
 
170 To be fair, some members of the Coalition, such as Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance Director Jay Garner, did express discomfort with the potential destabilizing consequences of the 
CPA’s first two orders.  (Frontline: The Lost Year in Iraq.) 
171 Eisenstadt and White, 4. 
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illustrate to the population that actual grievances are being addressed rather than trying to 
convince them that a flawed policy is in their best interest. 
The second lesson of framing combines competing collective identities with 
framing contests.  Lumping disparate groups into a single category, like failing to 
separate insurgents with no future in the new government from Iraqis who were simply 
unsure of their future, shows an alarming lack of precision that will inevitably lead to 
inadequate policies.  In reality, identity groups are rarely monolithic blocks acting in 
complete unison.  At any given time, an individual has internalized various collective 
identities, with differing degrees of salience and loyalty to each one.172  Unfortunately, 
the Coalition has yet to capitalize on this and its political maneuvering in the hearts and 
minds campaign has been characterized by misunderstanding, misapplied frames and 
misdirected messages.  Applying the historical identities in this study to a thorough 
understanding of the current competing subsets within the Sunni identity may highlight 
framing contests between the actors.  These contests will highlight fissures within the 
identity group.  These fissures can then be exploited so each group will be targeted with 
customized incentives for compliance with US objectives and disincentives for 
countering those objectives. 
In conclusion, I have illustrated that the Sunni insurgency in Iraq is not a clash of 
civilizations or a religious battle, but a secular conflict based upon specific political 
grievances and explained by predictable factors that can be applied to future conflicts.  
While the conflict in Iraq will surely rage for some time to come, and may even be only 
one facet of a larger Sunni-Shi’a struggle for dominance across the region, one point still 
provides hope.  Eventually, just as with Protestants and Catholics during the 
Reformation, this conflict will exhaust itself and “the majority of Shias and Sunnis will 
settle for a political order that they can share – not dominated by one or the other, 
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